The Causes and Consequences of Women's Representation in Local Governments by Funk, Kendall Dawn
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
A Dissertation
by
KENDALL DAWN FUNK
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Maria Escobar-Lemmon
Co-Chair of Committee, Kenneth J. Meier
Committee Members, Michelle Taylor-Robinson
Justin Bullock
Head of Department, William Clark
May 2017
Major Subject: Political Science
Copyright 2017 Kendall Dawn Funk
ABSTRACT
Local governments are thought to be more conducive to women’s representation be-
cause they are closer to home, easier to access, and require less time and resources than
positions in higher levels of government. However, women remain severely underrepre-
sented even at the local level. What are the causes and consequences of women’s (un-
der)representation in local governments? This dissertation contributes to the small, but
growing, body of research that seeks to answer this question by examining women’s lo-
cal representation both within a single country and across multiple countries over time.
Within the dissertation, I develop several theoretical arguments and test these theories us-
ing data from Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America. The first theory I present is that
decentralization has a detrimental impact on women’s local representation. By increasing
the power and desirability of local offices, decentralization creates barriers to women’s lo-
cal representation. I find evidence that Latin American countries with high levels of fiscal
and administrative decentralization have fewer women in local legislatures than countries
with low levels of decentralization. Second, I present the glass cliff theory—the idea that
women are more likely to attain leadership positions under precarious circumstances—
and test whether women mayoral candidates in Brazil face a glass cliff. I find that women
are more likely to be nominated to run for mayor when their political party is competing
against an incumbent. In addition, women are more likely to be nominated in municipali-
ties with small and decreasing budgets. These findings provide evidence that women face
a glass cliff in their pursuit of local political representation. Third, I examine some of the
consequences of women’s representation as local chief executives in Brazilian municipal-
ities. Particularly, I test the theory that women’s leadership styles are more inclusive and
participatory than men’s styles of leading. I present evidence that the leadership styles of
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men and women mayors in Brazil don’t differ significantly, but there are important gender
differences in the types of policy areas in which local executives initiate participation. I
conclude that leadership strategy, more so than style, determines whether an elected offi-
cial will choose to increase citizen participation in specific areas.
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1. INTRODUCTION: WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Women make up half of the world’s population, but are underrepresented in nearly ev-
ery political institution in every country around the world. What explains women’s histor-
ical underrepresentation and why women are better represented in some institutions than
in others? Does it matter that women are numerically underrepresented? These questions
have concerned a growing body of scholars from a number of disciplines (for a review of
the literature, see Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007). However, research on women and
political institutions remains scarce compared to the number of studies that focus de facto
on (usually white, elite) men in political institutions. Given women’s historical under-
representation, the study of politics almost always results in the study of men in politics.
Research that ignores the potential effects of gender implicitly assumes either (1) gender
doesn’t affect politics—e.g., women and men politicians act the same way, have the same
career incentives, and represent in the same fashion—and thus the role of gender doesn’t
deserve scholarly attention or (2) women’s representation isn’t important and their un-
derrepresentation shouldn’t concern scholars of politics. Are these assumptions accurate?
When does gender matter for political institutions and outcomes?
If the literature on gender and politics has anything to say, it’s that gender almost
always matters in politics. The effects of gender may manifest in subtle, intangible, or even
unobservable ways, but gender matters across numerous contexts and can shape political
processes and outcomes in meaningful ways. In order to understand how gender matters,
it is important to first understand what is gender. Gender (like race) is a social construct. It
is a concept that was constructed through social norms and practices, rather than a physical
product of nature. Thus, conceptualizations of gender and gender identity vary across time
1
and space (Keiser et al. 2002). Gender is distinct from biological sex. Whereas sex refers
to one’s biological anatomy, gender is an identity to which an individual subscribes or to
which society ascribes an individual. Gender is often correlated with biological sex (i.e.,
cisgender), but need not be (i.e., transgender).1
Though gender is a social construct, that does not mean it doesn’t exist or should be
ignored. In fact, it is precisely because gender is a social construct that it is deserving
of attention. Gender—including gendered identities, norms, roles, and stereotypes—were
created by society and can be changed through evolving societal practices. Throughout
history and up to the present day, societies have been structured along gendered lines.
Gender is ubiquitous in the social world, including in politics and political institutions.
Gender and politics are deeply intertwined. Governments regulate which gender identities
are officially recognized, determine which gender groups are deserving of representation,
enact policies and budgets that have gendered consequences, and determine whether cer-
tain genders deserve rights and protections or reprimands and penalties (Funk Forthcom-
ing). Social and political institutions are gendered to the extent that “gender is present in
the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distributions of power in the various
sectors of social life" (Acker 1992, 567).
At the same time, gender shapes politics and political institutions. Numerous studies
find that once women enter political institutions, they express preferences and behaviors
1It’s unclear how the current research on women in politics applies to transgender women (and perhaps
gay women as well). To date, there has been very little research on transgender women in politics for at least
four reasons: (1) governments have failed to collect nuanced data on gender, (2) women leaders are hesitant
to publicly identify as anything other than cisgender, (3) transgender women are extremely underrepresented
in politics, and (4) there is little research on women in politics in general. Arguably, the experiences of
transgender women differ from cisgender women. However, transgender women likely experience the same
types of difficulties that cisgender women face – if not to a more extreme degree. I do not examine the
intricacies of gender and sexual orientation within this dissertation and assume that my research applies only
to cisgender, heterosexual women, though it likely has significant implications for other women as well. As
societal gender norms evolve and non-traditional expressions of gender and sexuality continue to expand,
it is imperative that future research explicitly take into account how politics affects and is affected by the
various gender groups that exist in society.
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that differ from their men counterparts (for a review of the literature, see Paxton, Kunovich
and Hughes 2007). However, even if women’s descriptive representation had no substan-
tive effect on outcomes, it is still important that women are present in governing institu-
tions. In other words, even if men and women in government express the same preferences,
behave in the same way, and have no differences in their career patterns or other aspects,
it still matters that women be represented in proportion to their numerical presence in the
population. Women’s presence in governing institutions creates a symbolic statement that
can feed back into the socialization of younger generations and shape gender roles in so-
ciety and in politics, as well as perceptions of and trust in political institutions (Campbell
and Wolbrecht 2006; Pitkin 1967; Riccucci, Van Ryzin and Lavena 2014). When half of
the population is not adequately represented in numeric terms (and likely in substantive
terms as well), there is something fundamentally flawed with the structure and functioning
of democracy. In other words, women’s extreme underrepresentation around the world
should be worrisome to advocates of democracy and equality.
In the remainder of this chapter, I first provide an outline of the dissertation highlight-
ing its purpose, importance, and unique empirical contributions. I then describe women’s
underrepresentation around the world and across political institutions focusing on the exec-
utive and legislative branches at different levels of government. The next section explains
the importance of local governments and the role local governments play in the lives of
women around the world. I then provide a review of past research on both the causes and
consequences of women’s representation in local governments and explain how the stud-
ies presented in the dissertation fit into the existing bodies of literature. The penultimate
section describes and provides justification for the selection of cases used in the empirical
studies included herein this dissertation. The final section concludes with a summary of
the contributions of the dissertation for research on politics.
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1.1 Outline of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess when and how gender matters in poli-
tics, both theoretically and empirically. I pursue this endeavor within a heretofore under
researched, but important, context — the local level of government. Studying women’s
descriptive and substantive representation in local governments is important because the
local level is thought to be more accessible to women and to provide a potential launch-
pad for women’s political careers. Yet, compared to the national level of government,
studies of when and how women gain access to representation in local governments and
what women do once they achieve representation has not received the scholarly attention
it deserves. In this dissertation, I examine both the causes and consequences of women’s
representation in local government offices within the context of Latin America.
This dissertation is motivated by a number of research questions. First and foremost,
when and how does gender matter for political institutions and outcomes? Do women face
more barriers than men in their pursuit of political representation? Do women lack access
to positions of power? Does the type of institution or level of government play a role? Is
the local level of government easier for women to access? Does representation at the local
level provide a pathway to power at the national level? Does decentralization improve or
hinder women’s representation in local governments? Do the causes of women’s repre-
sentation at the national level also affect representation at the local level? Once women
attain leadership positions, what are the consequences of their representation? Do women
leaders’ attitudes and behaviors differ from their men counterparts? Does women’s repre-
sentation have an impact on political outcomes and institutions? How do women confront
the double bind of acting both as a woman and as a leader?
The dissertation is composed of three separate empirical studies that engage with one
or more of these questions. Individually, each chapter provides insight into a different
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aspect of the relationship between gender and local politics in a specific empirical setting.
Collectively, the chapters contribute to a larger story about the causes and consequences of
women’s representation in politics and shed light on the importance of local governments
in the study of gender and politics. The first empirical chapter, chapter 2, analyzes how
decentralization shapes women’s representation across Latin American local governments.
I find that, by increasing the importance and desirability of local offices, decentralization
obstructs women’s pathways to representation in local governments. In chapter 3, I use the
case of Brazilian municipal elections to test whether women are more likely to be nomi-
nated by political parties under unfavorable circumstances. The results of the quantitative
analyses suggest that indeed women are more likely to be selected to run for local offices in
unfavorable circumstances—for instance, when their political party is competing against
an incumbent or when the party is competing in a municipality with a small or decreasing
budget. In the final empirical study presented in chapter 4, I examine whether women’s
styles of leading differ significantly frommen’s leadership styles using data from Brazilian
local governments. I find that, contrary to conventional expectations, women’s leadership
styles are not inherently more inclusive than men’s. Rather, I find evidence that both men
and women mayors are strategic in their decisions to increase citizen participation in poli-
tics.
1.2 Women’s Underrepresentation: A Global Phenomenon
Evaluating two of the most powerful political institutions, executives and legislatures,
it is clear that women’s underrepresentation is pandemic. At the national level of govern-
ment, very few women have served as chief executives. Though women have served as
presidents, prime ministers, or heads of state in places as diverse as Pakistan, Nicaragua,
Germany, Iceland, Chile, Switzerland, and Liberia, and though women’s executive repre-
sentation has increased notably over recent decades (see Figure 1.1; Jalalzai 2013), women
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chief executives continue to be rare. In 2016, a woman, Hillary Rodham Clinton, came the
closest any woman has ever been to being elected as President of the United States—an
office commonly referred to as “the leader of the free world." However, despite winning
the popular vote, Clinton failed to win the presidency; thus, leaving the executive glass
ceiling firmly intact in the United States.
Figure 1.1: Number of Women Presidents and Prime Ministers Over Time
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Source: Adapted from “Figure 3.1 Women Prime Ministers and Presidents over Time (108)" in Jalalzai
(2013, p. 36).
Women’s representation in legislatures around the world is significantly better com-
pared to women’s representation as chief executives. However, according to data from the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), as of 2016, only three countries had reached gender par-
ity at some point in time: Andorra (50% in 2011-2014), Rwanda (56.3% in 2008-2012 and
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63.8% in 2013-2016), and Bolivia (53.1% in 2014-2016). Several additional countries, in-
cluding Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden have come close to par-
ity with at least 40% women in their national legislatures. Yet, women in most countries
remain largely underrepresented by the national legislature. In fact, the global average of
women in national parliaments and legislatures was just 20.94% in 2016.
There is no dispute that women are numerically underrepresented in legislatures around
the world. However, the global average has doubled over the last two decades (the aver-
age was 10.26% in 1997) and there is significant regional and cross-country variation.
Figure 1.2 presents data on women’s average representation in legislatures across world
regions.2 While women’s legislative representation has improved over time across all re-
gions, representation in some regions appears to be growing much faster than in others.
Particularly, thanks to the widespread adoption of gender quotas (Franceschet, Krook and
Piscopo 2012; Tripp and Kang 2008), women’s representation in the Americas and Sub-
Saharan Africa has grown drastically over the past two decades. From 1997 to 2016,
representation increased by 14.41 percentage points in the Americas and by 12.72 points
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Data from countries in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada
suggest that this trend of underrepresentation is largely echoed at the local level of gov-
ernment.3 However, a larger number of countries have reached gender parity in local
legislatures, including Belarus, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Further,
women’s average representation in local legislative councils in Europe, Central Asia, and
the Americas was 32.14% in 2013, compared to 17.99% at the national level in these
regions that same year. Figure 1.3 shows that women’s average representation in local
2Countries are grouped into regions according to the World Bank’s regional classifications.
3Local level data are from No Ceilings: The Full Participation Project, available at
http://noceilings.org/data.
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Figure 1.2: Average Percent Women in Legislatures, by Region
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Note: Data on the percent women in the lower house of the national legislature are from the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, www.ipu.org).
legislative councils has increased significantly from 1998 to 2013, but the highest global
average (32.14% in 2013) still falls 17.86 percentage points short of equal representation.
Figure 1.4 comparing women’s average levels of representation at the national and
local levels in Europe & Central Asia and the Americas (including Latin America, the
Caribbean, and Canada), suggests that women domuch better—at least in numeric terms—
in local legislatures than in national level ones.4 In 2012, women’s representation in local
legislatures outperformed national legislatures by about 3.92 percentage points in Europe
4The United States is excluded due to a lack of comprehensive data on women’s representation in local
governments across the entire U.S.
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Figure 1.3: Average Percent Women in Local Legislatures Over Time
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Note: Regions included are Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Canada. Data are
from No Ceilings: The Full Participation Project.
and Central Asia (local average = 28.29, national average = 24.37) and 7.78 percentage
points in the Americas (local average = 27.12, national average = 19.34). Since women’s
representation is usually higher at the local level than at the national level, does this mean
that local governments are easier for women to access and may provide a steppingstone to
higher office? Or is this an indication that women are “stuck" in local governments and
lack access to national-level institutions?
1.3 The Importance of Local Governments
Local governments make up the lowest level of government and are thought to be the
closest to the people. Local governments, because of the proximity of local represen-
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Figure 1.4: Average Percent Women in National and Local Legislatures
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tatives to those they represent, are argued to have better information about constituents’
preferences, which results in a closer match between citizen preferences and the allocation
of public goods (Tiebout 1956). In addition to being more responsive to citizen prefer-
ences, local governments are argued to be easier to monitor (Khemani 2001), less corrupt
(Fisman and Gatti 2002), and more efficient (Rondinelli 1989) than the central level of
government. Because of these supposed virtues, many countries around the world—often
under the pressure of international lending agencies—chose to decentralize resources, re-
sponsibilities, and authority to local governments. This increased the importance of local
governments around the world. After decentralization, local governments were entrusted
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with important powers, such as the ability to formulate and implement policy, collect taxes,
set budgets, and administer public goods and services.
At the same time, decentralization increased the salience of local governments in the
lives of women. Social services that tend to disproportionately affect women via their fam-
ilies’ welfare, like health care and education, were among those most commonly decentral-
ized to local governments. In addition, entrusting local governments with policymaking
powers meant that local governments could enact policies with gendered consequences,
such as policies that affect women’s reproductive healthcare (Franceschet and Piscopo
2012) or access to services like free childcare or shelters for abused women (Meier and
Funk 2017). Local governments are also responsible for implementing policies—some
of which are legislated by higher levels of government—and can thus shape the way that
laws are put into effect. This means that national-level laws that are intended to benefit
women may or may not actually benefit women if local governments have discretion in
how the law is executed. For example, if local governments can impose additional qualifi-
cations that limit access to government programs and services national-level policies may
not reach all women intended beneficiaries.
Decentralization, particularly political decentralization, also increased the number of
spaces in which women could potentially be represented. Creating more spaces for repre-
sentation at the local level was especially important for women because local governments
are thought to be easier for women to access. Being close to home and requiring less time,
campaigning, and political resources (e.g., access to networks, support staff, large electoral
bases) than the national or even state level of government, positions in local government
allow women greater opportunity to balance home and political life and are thus more
compatible with women’s traditional roles in society. This is especially relevant for small
local governments where, unlike large cities and government capitals, being an elected
representative is often a part time job. Women are often active in local community events
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and neighborhood associations, which is another reason why the local level is thought to be
more accessible to women. Women’s local activism can translate into credible experience
for local elected office (Beall 2005; Massolo 1996). Experience in local government may
also help women access positions in higher levels of government (Buckley et al. 2015).
By allowing women to gain experience, sharpen their political skills, and build networks
within their political party, office-holding in local governments can provide a launchpad
for women’s political careers. Experience in local public office may even be an informal
prerequisite for office-holding at higher levels of government in many countries (UNDP
2013).
Local governments—especially local governments in decentralized countries—are im-
portant political entities that can have a significant impact on the lives of women and men.
It matters who is represented in local political institutions and what decisions are made
by these representatives (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004;
Wängnerud and Sundell 2012). However, little is known about local governments around
the world and even less is known about how local governments shape women’s descriptive
and substantive representation. Local governments appear to offer unique opportunities
for women’s representation, but they may also pose serious challenges for women. Local
informal institutions and political networks that control the recruitment and nomination
of political candidates tend to exclude women (Beall 2005; Hinojosa 2012) and preju-
dices against women may be stronger at the local level (Manor 1999). It’s also unclear
whether the factors known to shape women’s descriptive and substantive representation at
the national level of government apply to the local level as well. Finally, though women’s
representation is usually higher at the local level than at the national, there is signifi-
cant cross-country variation and women’s local representation doesn’t always outperform
women’s level of representation in the national government.
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1.4 Women in Local Governments: The Causes
The few studies that have focused on the determinants of women’s representation as lo-
cal chief executives and local legislators in the United States, Europe, and Latin America
find that many of the factors that influence women’s representation in national govern-
ments also shape women’s local representation. Similar to the national level, electoral
systems and institutional arrangements at the local level of government (e.g., proportional
representation, district magnitude, term limits) shape women’s descriptive representation
in local governments (Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian and Trounstine 2015; Crowder-Meyer
and Smith 2015; Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012; Schmidt 2003). Most notably, similar
to the national level, the adoption of gender quotas play an enormous role in increasing
women’s presence in local governments (Archenti and Tula 2007; Bird 2003; Jones 2004;
Schmidt and Saunders 2004). However, like at the national level, in order for gender quo-
tas to be effective, parties’ lists of candidates must include women in electable positions
(Archenti and Tula 2011; Jones 1998, 2004). Quotas also tend to be more effective in
closed-lists systems (Archenti and Tula 2007; Jones and Navia 1999) and are more suc-
cessful in increasing women’s representation in local legislatures than in local executive
offices (Archenti and Albaine 2012; Jiménez Polanco 2011).
The political party system and party-level attributes also shape women’s local repre-
sentation. Parties can choose to adopt gender quotas in the absence of nationally legislated
quotas or instate quotas that are higher than the mandated minimum, which increases
women’s opportunities to become political candidates (Jones 2004). A party’s ideology
and commitment (or lack thereof) to improving women’s representation can also shape
women’s chances of becoming viable candidates. Since political parties typically domi-
nate candidate recruitment and selection processes, they act as gatekeepers to local elected
office. The formal and informal rules and norms that parties establish can both facilitate
13
and hinder women’s local representation (Archenti and Tula 2011; Hennings and Urbatsch
2016; Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012). For example, the decentralization of candidate
selection procedures has been argued to hamper women’s chances of being nominated
because women are typically excluded from local power enclaves (Hinojosa 2009, 2012;
Wylie and dos Santos 2016). In addition, since women are less likely to self-nominate
and voter bias may disadvantage women in primary elections, women do better when can-
didate selection procedures are exclusive—that is, when party elites choose candidates
(Hennings and Urbatsch 2016; Hinojosa 2009, 2012).
Socioeconomic and cultural factors matter for women’s local representation as well.
Across Europe, women’s local representation increases as female labor force participa-
tion rates, support for leftist parties, and levels of urbanization increase (Sundström and
Stockemer 2015). However, corruption at the local level—which tends to benefit those
already in power and prolong male-dominated networks—results in less women in Euro-
pean local councils (Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). Traditional views of gender roles
and local cultural norms may also act as a barrier to women’s local representation. For
example, women in rural and less developed municipalities may be reluctant to run for
local offices (or discouraged from running) because holding political office is inconsis-
tent with women’s traditional gender roles (Schmidt 2011). Gender stereotypes, partic-
ularly stereotypes that make women seem unfit to be leaders (e.g., emotional, passive,
submissive, weak, soft), can also harm women’s chances of being nominated and elected
to local offices. Yet, gender stereotypes affect women at all levels of government and
may be even more pronounced and have greater negative consequences at higher levels
of government—which tend to be more powerful and prestigious than local level offices
(Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).
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1.4.1 The Gendered Consequences of Decentralization
Among the factors that shape women’s representation is the power and desirability of
political office (Diamond 1977; Gidengil and Vengroff 1997; Hill 1981; Welch and Karnig
1979). Since powerful political offices come with resources, prestige, and opportunities
for patronage, they are more desirable than positions that lack power. And since these po-
sitions are more desirable, there is more competition for them. This disadvantages women
because women are more likely than men to lack access to important political networks
and resources that are necessary to win a competitive election (Beall 2005; Franceschet and
Piscopo 2014; Hinojosa 2012). Women are often seen—and at times see themselves—as
less qualified and capable leaders than men (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Eagly 2007;
Fox and Lawless 2004; Fulton 2012) and this notion is intensified as the power of the posi-
tion increases. Women are further disadvantaged by stereotypes that make women appear
to be incompatible with positions of power (Eagly and Carli 2007; Stivers 2002). Power,
being nearly synonymous with masculine traits and norms of behavior, elicits images of
men rather than women.
In the context of local governments, the power of local offices varies according to the
level of decentralization. In chapter 2, I test whether increasing the power and desirabil-
ity of local governments via decentralization has detrimental impacts on women’s local
representation. Using data from local elections in Latin America from 2000 to 2013, I
find that women’s representation in local legislative councils is lowest in the presence of
fiscal and administrative decentralization. This finding suggests that there are gendered
consequences to decentralization reforms that should be taken into consideration when
evaluating whether decentralization is a worthwhile endeavor for countries to pursue. The
general literature is mixed in its conclusions about whether decentralization is good or bad
for many political, social, and economic outcomes. The findings presented in chapter 2
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add to the body of evidence that suggests that decentralization is not the panacea advocates
hoped it would be because of the negative effects it has on women’s local representation.
1.4.2 The Glass Cliff
In the third chapter, I consider another potential cause of women’s (under)representation
in local politics: the glass cliff. The glass cliff theory is the idea that women (and other
historically marginalized groups) are more likely to be selected as leaders under precari-
ous conditions (Ryan and Haslam 2005); for example, when a business is failing or when
a political party is losing support. Women are more likely to encounter a glass cliff for at
least four reasons (Ryan and Haslam 2007). First, since women have traditionally occu-
pied roles as unpaid homemakers and caregivers, their careers (and incomes) are viewed
as optional and supplemental to that of their husbands. Thus, women are seen as more
expendable and are more likely to be chosen for an undesirable position in which failure
is likely. Second, because in-group favoritism works to reserve attractive leadership posi-
tions for men, men are likely to avoid unfavorable positions, leaving these roles open for
women to fill. Third, unfavorable positions might be viewed as opportunities for women
to “prove themselves" and advance their careers. Fourth, selecting a woman leader might
signal to stakeholders that the organization is changing and bringing in new perspectives
and leadership strategies in order to advert falling off “the cliff."
I examine whether women confront a glass cliff in their pursuit of local elected office
within the context of Brazilian local governments. Using data covering local elections
in more than 5,000 municipalities involving over 40,000 candidates from 2004 to 2012,
I find that women are more likely to be nominated by political parties when the party is
in a weak position (i.e., competing against an incumbent mayor or incumbent party) and
when the party is competing in a less desirable municipality (i.e., a municipality with a
small or decreasing budget). Nominating women under these unfavorable circumstances
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can have detrimental impacts on women’s future political representation. Women who are
nominated to compete against strong incumbents are less likely to win elections; and if
women lose local elections repeatedly—because they are competing at a disadvantage—
this can affect views of women as candidates, reinforce negative stereotypes about women
as leaders, and cause political party leaders to be reluctant to nominate women in the
future. Women who compete for—and even win—elections in undesirable municipalities
may have limited political opportunities in the future because they may be blamed for the
poor municipal performance that began before they entered office. Thus, the glass cliff
can contribute to keeping women underrepresented in local political institutions.
1.5 Women in Local Governments: The Consequences
Once women do succeed in attaining local office, do they have an effect on local out-
comes? What are the consequences of women’s local representation? Like women in
national legislatures, women in local legislative councils often find themselves in the least
powerful and more feminine positions. Studies of local councilors in France and Denmark
find that women are more likely to be assigned to legislative committees for traditionally
feminine issues, such as social affairs, education, and children’s issues, and are underrep-
resented in masculine committees like finance and public works (Bird 2003; Baekgaard
and Kjaer 2012). However, these studies also find that women prefer to be on these types
of committees, indicating that gender differences in local committee assignments can be
attributed more to supply-side than demand-side factors. There is some indication that
women face discrimination in local governments as early termination of the legislature in
Italian municipalities is more likely when there is a woman mayor. Further, the probabil-
ity that a woman mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the legislative
council is composed entirely of men and in areas with unfavorable views towards women
in the workforce (Gagliarducci and Paserman 2012).
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Despite these obstacles, women at the local level are able to represent women’s sub-
stantive interests. Increasing women’s presence as elected officials and public adminis-
trators in Brazilian municipalities, for example, leads to the adoption of more women-
friendly policies and public services for women (Meier and Funk 2017). In the United
States, women mayors and city councilors influence city expenditure decisions in ways
that benefit women (Holman 2014a,b; Smith 2014), and in India, women elected lead-
ers invest in infrastructure projects related to women’s issues (Chattopadhyay and Duflo
2004). More women in local councils led to increases in childcare coverage in Norwegian
municipalities (Bratton and Ray 2002) and increased spending on childcare and education
in Sweden (Svaleryd 2009). Additional research on Sweden finds that women’s local leg-
islative representation can lead to greater gender equality in terms of income, employment
status, and the distribution of parental leave (Wängnerud and Sundell 2012).
Women’s representation in local offices can also affect perceptions of women as lead-
ers. For example, the election of women mayors in Mexico reduced gender stereotypes
among men, but the effects were temporary and diminished after the woman left office
(Kerevel and Atkeson 2015). Women’s presence in local councils in India also led to
changes in voter attitudes. After having a woman chief councilor for two terms, voters
expressed more positive views of women in leadership (Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani
2009). Evidence from Chile suggests that women’s success in local elections can improve
perceptions of women among political party leaders as well and lead to more nomina-
tions of women candidates (Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014). However, the presence
of gender quotas may interfere with women’s impact on voter attitudes. In the case of
Lesotho, citizens reacted negatively to the design of the gender quota, which resulted in
a decrease in voters’ interest in politics and perceptions of councilors’ responsiveness to
citizens (Clayton 2015). Women in local political offices can also have demonstration ef-
fects that lead to the election of even more women at the local level (Crowder-Meyer and
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Smith 2015; Gilardi 2015).
Finally, increasing women’s representation in local governments can change the struc-
ture and practices of local institutions. Research finds that women mayors in the United
States may increase women’s employment representation in municipal bureaucracies, es-
pecially in traditionally male-dominated sectors like finance (Kerr, Miller and Reid 1998;
Saltzstein 1986, but see Ferreira and Gyourko (2014)). In the context of Brazil, electing
women mayors leads to smaller gender wage gaps and increases in the average salaries of
women in the municipal executive bureaucracy, indicating that women mayors contribute
to improving gender equality within the local bureaucracy (Funk, Silva and Escobar-
Lemmon N.d.). Additional study of Brazil finds that women mayors are less likely than
men to engage in corruption and patronage politics (Brollo and Troiano 2016). Women’s
representation in local councils may also improve government transparency and reduce
information asymmetries, as was found in the case of Spanish local governments (Araujo
and Tejedo-Romero 2016). Women local leaders may also increase opportunities for citi-
zen participation in local government decision-making processes (Weikart et al. 2007).
1.5.1 Women’s Leadership Styles
In chapter 4, I delve further into the theory that women lead in ways that are more
inclusive and are more likely to create opportunities for citizen participation in politics.
Previous literature, mostly based on qualitative case studies, finds that women have dif-
ferent leadership styles than their men counterparts (for a review, see Eagly and Johnson
1990). These studies suggest that women’s leadership styles are less hierarchical and more
open, democratic, and inclusive. However, very few studies had examined the differences
in men’s and women’s leadership styles using quantitative evidence. I begin to fill this gap
in the literature by testing whether women mayors are more likely to increase citizen par-
ticipation using data on the adoption of two types of participatory institutions in Brazilian
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local governments: participatory budgeting and participatory policy councils.
I find that women’s leadership styles aren’t inherently more participatory than men’s.
Women mayors are not more likely to initiate participatory budgeting and create roughly
the same number of participatory policy councils as do men mayors. However, I do find
significant gender differences in the types of policy areas in which men and women mayors
decide to open participation. Men mayors are more likely to create participatory councils
in the areas of women’s right’s, children’s rights, and heath care, while women mayors are
more likely to create participatory councils for sports issues. These findings suggest that
the decision to increase citizen participation in a particular policy area may be a strategic
choice that elected officials make in order to counter gender stereotypes and appeal to the
opposite gender. Thus, strategy, more so than style, likely determines whether an elected
leader will increase opportunities for citizen participation in politics.
1.6 Context and Case Selection
In this dissertation, I focus on women’s local representation in executive and legisla-
tive offices across Latin America and within Brazilian municipalities. I focus on local
chief executives and local legislators because these institutions dominate political power
in most local governments. Executive and legislative offices are elected positions in many
countries, even those that are highly centralized. In addition, these institutions are struc-
tured similarly within and across countries in Latin America, making them comparable.
Further, while data on women’s representation in local venues such as bureaucracies, ju-
diciaries, and political parties are scarce, there exist reliable data on the percent women
in local executive and legislative institutions across Latin America. Studying women’s
representation in these venues is important because local governments are responsible for
an increasing number of government programs and control a sizable amount of resources.
In addition, the policy choices that local governments make can have a real impact on the
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lives of citizens. This is especially true for women, who tend to be disproportionately
impacted by changes in government programs and social services and may be negatively
affected by local policies dealing with gendered issues, like reproductive healthcare or
domestic violence.
1.6.1 Latin America: The Laboratory for Decentralization
Chapter 2 examines women’s representation in the executive and legislative branches
across Latin American local governments. Latin America is made up of the 19 Spanish-
and Portuguese-speaking countries in Central and South America.5 Latin America is a
large, important region that controls a substantial portion of the world economy and is
home to about 10% of the world’s population. In the 1980s and 1990s, several countries
in Latin America experimented with decentralization as a potential way to solve many
social, political, and economic ills. These experiments with decentralization resulted in
the creation of diverse political arrangements throughout the region, with some countries
being highly decentralized, others highly centralized, and most others somewhere in be-
tween. Latin American countries not only vary in their level of decentralization, but also in
the ways in which decentralization was implemented (Falleti 2010; Montero and Samuels
2004).
At the same time, there is significant variation in levels of women’s representation at
the local level across Latin America. Some countries, such as Bolivia and Costa Rica,
have reached more than 40% women in local legislative councils on average, while others,
such as Guatemala, Panama, and Brazil, have failed to exceed an average of 15% women
in local legislatures. Given the extent of variation in both levels of decentralization and
levels of women’s local representation, Latin America provides an interesting and useful
5This region includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
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case in which to examine the effects of various decentralized institutional arrangements
on women’s representation in local executive and legislative offices. The countries that
make up Latin America also have much in common—for instance, colonial history, lan-
guage, culture, economic trends—so many potentially confounding variables can be held
(nearly) constant across the region. This research design mimics the most similar sys-
tems design (Mill’s Method of Difference) wherein cases are similar in all aspects except
the key dependent variable, making it easier to identify the key independent variable that
drives variation in the dependent variable.
1.6.2 Brazil: Taking Local Politics Seriously
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the causes and consequences of women’s representation in
the context of Brazilian local governments. Brazilian municipalities provide a particularly
useful case for research design purposes. Local governments in Brazil are structured to be
mini-reflections of the national government. Each municipality has an autonomous local
government that consists of a chief executive (Prefeito) and a local legislature (Câmara
Municipal). However, Brazilian municipal governments lack judicial power as courts only
exist at the state and federal levels. Local executives and legislators are elected by popu-
lar vote every four years, with the most recent local elections occurring in October 2016.
Brazil is a highly decentralized country. The 1988 Brazilian constitution allows each mu-
nicipality to draft legislation, implement policy, collect taxes, and receive transfers from
the state and federal governments. This means that while local governments in Brazil share
the same institutional arrangements, they vary in almost every other aspect, including in
levels of women’s local representation as mayors and city councilors.
An additional reason why Brazilian local governments are useful for research is be-
cause the Brazilian federal government collects and disseminates systematic data on a
number of political, social, and economic indicators for each of its 5,570 municipal gov-
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ernments. As opposed to studies of local governments in the United States, studies of
Brazilian local governments do not (or should not) suffer from an urban bias. The avail-
ability of data for all municipalities—not just very large ones—means that the Brazilian
sample is representative of both urban and rural populations. Finally, Brazil is an impor-
tant country not only in Latin America, but in the world. Brazil is home to more than 205
million people and, with a gross domestic product of $3.14 trillion (USD) in 2016, makes
up one of the largest economies in the world.6
Knowing what shapes women’s descriptive and substantive representation in this con-
text has important implications for the rest of the world. Not only can women’s representa-
tion in local governments send a symbolic signal to Brazilian citizens about the importance
of women’s representation, but it can start a diffusion process that impacts women’s rep-
resentation across municipalities or across political parties (Gilardi 2015; Matland and
Studlar 1996). Increasing representation in this context might also entice neighboring
countries, or countries similar to Brazil, to increase women’s representation as well. Sec-
ond, if women do govern differently than men, then women’s presence (or lack thereof)
in governing institutions has implications for the creation and implementation of public
policy that can spillover outside of Brazil’s borders.
1.7 Contributions of the Dissertation
Much of the causes and consequences of women’s representation in local governments
around the world remains unknown. However, this dissertation provides much needed
insight into the local processes that shape women’s descriptive and substantive representa-
tion at the local level. Through scientific research and empirical analyses, I assess women’s
local representation throughout Latin America and within Brazil. The theoretical develop-
ments and findings presented in this dissertation have important implications not only for
6Data obtained by the author from CIA World Factbook on March 15, 2017 from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html.
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the study of gender and politics, but for the general study of politics as well. Particularly,
this dissertation brings attention to the importance of local governments and the role that
local governments can play in improving or hindering women’s political representation. It
also contributes to knowledge about the consequences of women’s representation in pol-
itics and why it matters that women be represented in political institutions. In the final
chapter, I discuss the implications of the dissertation research in greater detail, explain the
limitations and generalizability of my findings, and provide guidance for future research
on the causes and consequences of women’s representation in local governments across
the globe.
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2. LOCALIZED WOMEN: THE GENDERED CONSEQUENCES OF
DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS
Countries around the world—including many in Latin America—have undergone de-
centralization reforms in hopes of improving government responsiveness, the delivery of
public services, and the functioning of democracy in general by bringing government
closer to the people (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Blair 2000; Daughters and Harper
2007). Decentralization reforms have been adopted far and wide. As of 1999, nearly all
countries across the globe had experimented with some form of decentralization “as a so-
lution to many different kinds of problems" (Manor 1999, vii). However, these reforms
had many unintended consequences, such as interfering with the provision of government
programs (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Treisman 2007), increasing income inequality
(Prud’homme 1995), and worsening macroeconomic performance (Wibbels 2000). Did
decentralization also have the unintended consequence of hindering women’s representa-
tion at the local level?
Decentralization reforms involved the extensive transfer of resources, responsibilities,
and authorities to lower levels of government (Falleti 2005). Post-decentralization, subna-
tional governments were not only responsible for overseeing major public services, such
as education, health, sanitation, and infrastructure, but also for setting the political agenda
and creating public policy in numerous areas. Decentralization reforms created new spaces
for political representation, and also increased the political, fiscal, and administrative pow-
ers of local governments. This increase in power had the result of increasing the attractive-
ness of subnational offices. Following decentralization, some subnational offices became
even more desirable than national-level ones (Montero and Samuels 2004; Samuels 2003).
I argue that increasing the power, and thus the desirability, of local offices via de-
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centralization simultaneously impedes women’s ability to gain representation at the local
level. Women face a disadvantage in competitions for powerful political offices because
they are more likely than men to lack access to elite political networks (Franceschet and
Piscopo 2014), and the power enclaves that dominate candidate recruitment and selec-
tion for local elected offices (Hinojosa 2012). Moreover, women are often viewed—and
at times view themselves—as less qualified and capable leaders than their men counter-
parts (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Eagly 2007; Fox and Lawless 2004; Stivers 2002),
further hindering their ability to attain representation in powerful political institutions.
Finally, since power is nearly synonymous with stereotypically masculine norms of be-
havior, women (who are assumed to lack such traits) are perceived to be incompatible
with positions of power.
In this study, I examine whether women are concentrated—or localized—in the posi-
tions with the least amount of power. Specifically, are women localized in local govern-
ments that lack power? I address this question using data from local elections in Latin
America from 2000 to 2013. Results from the statistical analyses suggest that implement-
ing fiscal and administrative decentralization reforms hinders women’s representation on
local legislative councils, while political decentralization does not have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on women’s local representation. These findings suggest that decentraliza-
tion may have significant gendered consequences that should be taken into consideration
when assessing whether decentralization generally improves or worsens the functioning of
democratic countries. The findings also imply – rather than creating institutions that lack
power, but may be more amenable to women’s representation – countries should take mea-
sures to offset the potential negative consequences of decentralization of the representation
of women.
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2.1 Decentralization: The Good, the Bad, and the Women
Decentralization is the “set of policies, electoral reforms, or constitutional reforms
that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of gov-
ernment" (Falleti 2010, 34; italics in original). Decentralization has been advocated by
prominent international organizations, including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, as a way to improve democratic governance (Manor 1999). However,
after many years of experimentation with decentralization and decades of research (Falleti
2010; Prud’homme 1995; Treisman 2007), there is still uncertainty about the consequences
of decentralization reforms and whether decentralization actually accomplishes the goals
it was designed to achieve.
2.1.1 The Good
Advocates argue that decentralization brings government closer to the people and lo-
cal government officials are more aware of and responsive to the preferences of their local
community. These studies find that decentralization has a positive impact on the deliv-
ery of public goods and services (Faguet and Sánchez 2008; Solé-Ollé 2009), lowers
levels of corruption (Fisman and Gatti 2002), and helps to improve resource allocation
through better knowledge of local preferences and competition among localities (Leder-
man, Loayza and Soares 2005; Oates 1972; Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 1983). Studies
stress the importance of local political competition created by decentralization, suggesting
that competition allows people to “vote with their feet" (Tiebout 1956), and higher levels
of competition yield more responsive local governments, while localities lacking compe-
tition are subject to elite capture, which results in distortions in the provision of public
goods (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Faguet 2009). Higher levels of electoral compe-
tition in local governments are associated with greater accountability (Escobar-Lemmon
and Ross 2014), lower levels of clientelism (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros and Estévez 2007;
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Weitz-Shapiro 2012), more efficient government (Fiszbein 1997), and increasing gov-
ernment responsiveness (Cleary 2007; Faguet 2004; Ferejohn 1986; Manor 1999; Oates
1972).
2.1.2 The Bad
However, many researchers remain skeptical of the supposed benefits of decentraliza-
tion (e.g., Prud’homme 1995; Treisman 2007). These authors argue that local politicians
are more susceptible to elite capture because they are easily influenced by local elites
who attempt to divert goods and services away from their intended recipients to benefit
themselves (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). Studies also question whether corrupt local
officials abuse their political power by wasting resources and abusing public trust. Other
studies argue that local governments have less fiscal and administrative capacity than the
central government because they lack the resources necessary for the allocation of pub-
lic goods and services (Crook and Sverrisson 1999) and local capacities are negated by
mechanisms of political supervision and control (Samoff 1990; Slater 1989). Further stud-
ies suggest that decentralization has a negative impact on macroeconomic performance
(Wibbels 2000), and may lead to higher levels of inflation (Treisman 2000), larger deficits
(Rodden 2002), and increased income inequality and economic disparities (Prud’homme
1995).
2.1.3 The Women
While numerous studies have debated the consequences of decentralization for the
delivery of public services, government accountability, and various economic outcomes,
very few have considered the potential gendered consequences of decentralization reforms.
Countries undergoing decentralization frequently devolved responsibility for the delivery
of social services, such as education and healthcare, to local governments (Falleti 2005;
Tordoff 1994). Since social issues tend to affect women disproportionately and are of-
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ten considered to be women’s domain, local governments became especially important
for the lives of women following decentralization. Decentralization also promised to in-
crease opportunities for representation and strengthen the link between representatives
and those they represent. There was an assumption that “subnational spaces, due to their
smaller scale," could reshape political opportunity structures in a way that accommodates
all social groups (UNDP 2013, 21) and that decentralization would be “a means to facili-
tate democracy by increasing the diversity of representatives in policy-making" (Patterson
2002, 490).
Opportunities to enhance women’s substantive representation increased after decen-
tralization as well, as policymaking authorities were devolved to subnational governments.
Yet, the devolution of policymaking also meant that subnational governments could enact
policies that disadvantage women or are opposed to women’s interests. Delegating policy-
making powers in Argentina, for example, resulted in both the expansion and suppression
of women’s reproductive rights as some provinces opted to restrict access to contraceptives
while others expanded access (Franceschet and Piscopo 2012). Further, even when gender
policies are adopted by the central government, the decentralization of power creates chal-
lenges for policy implementation. These difficulties arise “particularly in the absence of
oversight or coordinating mechanisms that ensure gender policies are implemented so that
women can claim rights and benefits granted to them by law" (Franceschet 2011, 274).
Thus, decentralization creates variation in both the types of policies that are adopted at
the subnational level as well as the outcomes of policies created by the national level, but
implemented by subnational governments. Decentralization at times facilitates the devel-
opment of pro-women policies and at other times obstructs it, which leads to disparate
impacts on women that vary according to where each woman lives (Franceschet 2011;
Gray 2006; Vickers 2010).
Local governments are thought to be more accessible to women because they are closer
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to home and require less time and resources (e.g., money, political capital) than offices at
the national or state levels—thus making the local level more conducive to child-rearing
and satisfying domestic duties. Further, since women often play an active role in neigh-
borhood associations and community organizations, the local sphere should be the easiest
venue for women to translate work in non-governmental and informal organizations into
relevant experiences for elected public office (Beall 2005; Massolo 1996). Local govern-
ment may also act as a steppingstone to higher office. If local politics are truly easier for
women to access, then the local level may serve as training grounds in which women are
able to gain experience and develop skills that prepare them for offices in higher levels of
government.
Do women have an advantage in local governments? Despite all of the theoretical rea-
sons to suggest yes, the few empirical studies that have addressed this question indicate
that the answer is likely no. Most local governments continue to be dominated by men and
the numerical presence of women isn’t always higher at the local level than at the national
(Eder et al. 2012; Escobar-Lemmon and Funk N.d.; Tolley 2011; UNDP 2013). Studies
further suggest that the local level may be less accessible and pose more obstacles than
the national level because local informal institutions are often not favorable for women
(Beall 2005) and prejudices against women are stronger at the local level in many countries
(Manor 1999, 84). Thus, rather than improving women’s political representation, “decen-
tralized state institutions may perpetuate gender inequalities and the political exclusion
of women" (Patterson 2002, 493). Furthermore, the adoption of legislative gender quo-
tas in many countries increases women’s access to national-level institutions (Franceschet,
Krook and Piscopo 2012), meaning that there now may be a “national advantage" for
women rather than a municipal one.
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2.2 How Decentralization Imposes a Power Barrier for Women
The literature on women in politics points to a number of reasons why women have
been underrepresented in political institutions throughout history. Factors such as electoral
institutions, political parties, government ideology, socioeconomic conditions, and atti-
tudes towards women can contribute to increasing or decreasing women’s representation.
Among these factors is political power. I theorize that power acts as an important barrier
to women’s representation in political institutions because power both (1) increases desir-
ability and competition for political office and (2) evokes images of men and masculinity.
Positions of power come with greater resources, prestige, and political patronage, mak-
ing them more desirable than positions that lack power. And since powerful positions are
more desirable, there is more demand and competition for these positions. This disad-
vantages women because women are more likely than men to lack access to the resources
needed to compete for desirable offices. The elite political networks and power enclaves
that dominate candidate recruitment and selection tend to exclude women (Beall 2005;
Franceschet and Piscopo 2014; Hinojosa 2012). Being built on gendered hierarchies in
which men dominate and women are merely extensions of their husbands or fathers, these
informal institutions often inhibit women’s political advancement. Lacking access to these
political networks means that women also lack access to the important political resources
and support doled out by these networks that make candidates viable in competitive elec-
tions. Moreover, women are often viewed as less qualified and capable political leaders
than men (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Eagly 2007; Fulton 2012)—a notion that is only
exacerbated as the power of the position increases.
Women are further disadvantaged by the conceptualization of power (and politics more
generally) as masculine domain. The traits typically associated with a powerful leader are
nearly synonymous with masculine traits and norms of behavior: strength, aggressiveness,
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independence, competitiveness, and extroversion. Conceptualizations of power elicit im-
ages of men and masculinity. Women, who are presumed to lack such masculine traits (and
may be punished for exhibiting them), are perceived to be incompatible with powerful po-
sitions (Eagly and Carli 2007; Stivers 2002). Evidence of women’s underrepresentation
in the most powerful positions has emerged in studies of chief executives (Jalalzai 2008,
2013) and cabinet ministers (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), as well as in
the committee assignments of men and women legislators (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and
Taylor-Robinson 2005).
In the context of local governments, increasing decentralization means increasing the
power and attractiveness of local offices. Following decentralization, local governments
became more important for both aspiring politicians and political parties seeking to in-
crease their share of power. In Brazil, for example, a position as governor or mayor of a
large city became more desirable than a seat in the national legislature (Samuels 2003).
Decentralization also contributed to increasing party system fragmentation and increased
the number of political parties that compete for power at the local level (Harbers 2010;
Ryan 2004; Sabatini 2003). This, along with political parties’ decentralization of candi-
date selection procedures (Hinojosa 2012), increased barriers for women’s entry into local
politics. Decentralization and increased party system fragmentation makes it harder for
women’s organizations to promote the election of women since they have to coordinate
across multiple political parties and levels of government. Further, as the number of par-
ties that compete and win seats at the local level increases, party magnitude—or the num-
ber of representatives elected from each party—decreases. Thus, each individual party’s
vote share is unlikely to be large enough to encompass the women who likely occupy the
bottom rungs of party electoral lists.
For all these reasons, I argue that bolstering the power and desirability of local govern-
ments by means of decentralization impedes women’s chances of gaining representation
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at the local level. I expect women’s local representation to decrease as the power (and
thus desirability) of local institutions increases. In other words, I expect that “the less
desirable and the less important the office, the more likely that women will hold it" (Welch
and Karnig 1979, 479; see also Diamond 1977 and Hill 1981).
Though research on women’s representation in local governments is sparse, there is
some evidence that women have been localized in the less powerful and less desirable lo-
cal offices. Across Latin America, countries with greater levels of fiscal decentralization
appear to “reserve" municipal positions for men as there is a negative correlation between
some measures of fiscal decentralization and the percent women in local offices (Escobar-
Lemmon and Funk N.d.; UNDP 2013, 56). Single-country studies find that women in
Brazil are elected to mayoral offices with less power (Blay and Soeiro 1979) and are more
likely to win elections in the poorer, less developed regions of Brazil (Miguel and Queiroz
2006) and that capital cities and large urban centers in Mexico are governed nearly exclu-
sively by men (Massolo 2007; Vázquez García 2010). Additional evidence that women’s
presence decreases as the power and desirability of the office increases can be found in
the fact that women are more successful in gaining representation in local legislatures than
local executive offices, which tend to be less powerful and prestigious than the execu-
tive branch (Archenti and Albaine 2012; Escobar-Lemmon and Funk N.d.; Hinojosa and
Franceschet 2012).
2.3 Case Selection, Data, and Variables
I examine the consequences of decentralization on women’s local representation in
the context of Latin America. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many countries in Latin
America experimented with decentralization. Pressure to decentralize came both from
the top-down as international lending institutions pushed borrowers to devolve powers to
subnational governments as well as the bottom-up as citizens fought to strengthen newly-
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minted democracies and local oligarchs sought to maintain control over local territories.
However, not all countries in the region chose to implement decentralization reforms, and
among those that did, decentralization was not implemented uniformly. This means that
there is variation in the extent to which decentralization manifested in countries across the
region. A further reason why Latin America poses a useful case for studying this question
is because there is significant variation in levels of women’s representation across countries
at all levels of government—including the local level. Finally, countries in the region
have many commonalities, such as a shared political and economic history, and cultural
norms, allowing for these potentially confounding variables to be held nearly constant at
the regional level.
Latin America consists of the 19 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in Cen-
tral and South America.1 Together, these countries are home to over 600 million people
(2015 est.) and contribute a significant amount to the global economy. Latin America
is part of the “Third Wave" of democracy (Huntington 1993), since nearly all countries
in the region underwent democratic transitions in the late 1970s to early 1990s. Along
with improvements in the overall levels of democracy and development throughout the
region, women’s representation across Latin America has also improved significantly over
time. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 2017, four of the ten coun-
tries with the highest levels of women’s representation in the lower house of parliament
were in Latin America: Bolivia (53.1%), Cuba (48.9%), Nicaragua (45.7%), and Mexico
(42.6%).2 Much of these gains can be attributed to effective gender quota laws aimed
at closing gender gaps and improving women’s political representation in these countries.
However, there are still laggards throughout the region. Among the countries in the bottom
1This includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
2Information obtained by the author on March 23, 2017 from the IPU website, available at
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
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50 in terms of women’s representation in national parliaments—alongside countries where
active discrimination against women is not only commonplace, but also legal—is Panama
(18.3%), Chile (15.8%), Paraguay (13.8%), Guatemala (12.7%), and Brazil (10.7%) (IPU
2017). Further, even in countries with high levels of women’s representation in parliament,
gender discrimination, violence against women, and cultural norms based inmachismo are
widespread.
2.3.1 Women’s Local Representation in Latin America
How does women’s representation at the local level compare? I focus on women’s
representation in legislative and executive offices at the lowest level of government (e.g.,
city, canton, municipality, district) in each country. Legislatures, and especially executives,
are often the most powerful actors in local governments and these two institutions are
structured similarly across Latin American countries.3 Figure 2.1 shows the maximum
level of women’s representation in local legislative councils among the 54 country-years
included in the dataset.4 Though none of the averages in these 17 countries reached parity,
a few countries, including Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Mexico, had greater than 35% women
in local legislative offices—a number commonly thought of as a “critical mass" (Kanter
1977). A few others (Brazil, Panama, and Guatemala), however, remain below 15%—
indicating that women may still be “tokens" in these local legislatures. Like at the national
level of government, women’s average representation in local legislatures has increased
over time—from around 17% in 2000 to about 26% in 2013. However, even the highest
average (in 2013) is only halfway to parity, indicating that women still have a long way to
3For more on the structure of local governments in Latin America, see Nickson (1995).
4See Appendix A for a list of countries and years included in the dataset, as well as descriptive statistics,
and sources of data. Observations were included in the analyses if there were no missing data on the two
dependent variables (percent women in the local legislature and percent women in executive offices) in that
country-year. Only one year from each electoral term was included in the analyses, except for the case
of Mexico in which local elections are non-concurrent (thus, the percent women in local office changes
annually).
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go in reaching gender equality in Latin American local legislatures.
Figure 2.1: Maximum Percent Women in Local Legislative Councils, 2000-2013
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Note: Only the maximum value for each country included in the dataset is shown. N = 54 country-years.
Figure 2.2 shows the maximum level of women’s representation as local executives
(e.g., mayors, prefects, municipal presidents) among the countries included in the data.
Overall, women’s representation is much lower in local executive offices than in local leg-
islatures. Only one country, Uruguay, has exceeded an average of 15% women executives,
and before 2005 Uruguay had no women in local executive offices. The overall average
for the sample is just 7.14% and women’s local executive representation hasn’t increased
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much over time. The average was around 6% in 2000 and increased to about 12% in
2013. These numbers indicate that while women are slowly gaining ground in local (and
national) legislatures, the most powerful of institutions, such as desirable local executive
offices, are still off-limits for many women. The unipersonal nature of local executive
offices, combined with the amount of power and prestige vested in these offices and the
lack of affirmative action policies (i.e., gender quotas) that promote women’s local repre-
sentation, might partly explain why women’s gains in legislatures are not mirrored in the
executive branch.
Figure 2.2: Maximum Percent Women Mayors, 2000-2013
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Note: Only the maximum value for each country included in the dataset is shown. N = 54 country-years.
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2.3.2 Measuring Decentralization
Does decentralization further hinder women’s access to local legislative and executive
offices? To address this question, it is important to first discuss what is decentralization
and how is it measured. I conceptualize and measure decentralization as the power of lo-
cal governments relative to the national government. Recent studies have disaggregated
decentralization into three dimensions: political, fiscal, and administrative. Political de-
centralization involves the devolution of political authority to subnational actors. Political
decentralization expands the electoral capacities of local governments and increases rep-
resentation and policymaking authority at the local level. Administrative decentralization
entrusts local governments with the responsibility of administering and delivering public
services, such as transportation, sanitation, education, or health care. Fiscal decentraliza-
tion increases the fiscal autonomy and revenue-gathering capacities of subnational govern-
ments by increasing fiscal transfers from higher levels of government and/or authorizing
subnational governments to collect local taxes (Falleti 2005, 329).
I measure political decentralization using a dichotomous indicator from the Compara-
tive Constitutions Project for whether subnational legislation can be reviewed by federal
entities according to each country’s constitution. I take the inverse of this variable to cre-
ate a measure of local lawmaking autonomy, wherein 1 = federal review of subnational
legislation is not allowed, and 0 = federal review is allowed by the constitution. A more
commonly used measure of political decentralization – whether elections are held at the
local level – is not useful in the context of Latin America, since all countries in the re-
gion hold local elections and thus this measure is a constant. Nonetheless, using local
lawmaking autonomy to measure political decentralization is appropriate because it cap-
tures the power of local governments relative to the national government in the context of
policymaking.
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To measure fiscal decentralization, I use a dichotomous variable that indicates whether
local governments can create new taxes (local new tax, 1 = yes, 0 = no) according to a
report published by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) in 2010 (Martínez-
Vázquez 2010, 212). Again, a more commonly used measure of fiscal decentralization
– local government expenditures (or revenues) as a percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) or total government expenditures (or revenues) – cannot be used to measure of
fiscal decentralization in this context because these data do not exist for many countries in
Latin America and are missing for several years included the in dataset.5
Finally, I measure administrative decentralization as a count of the number of social
services administered by the local level of government (local social services, range =
0 to 6) according to a report published by UCLG in 2008 (Rosales and Valencia 2008,
187). The services include primary school, primary health care, housing, general social
services, culture, and sports/leisure. Each area is considered to be administered by local
governments if the municipal level is solely responsible for delivering the service or if the
municipality shares administrative responsibility with another level of government. While
nearly all municipalities in Latin America are responsible for administering basic services
such as waste collection, road infrastructure, and urban planning, it is less common for
local governments to be in responsible for the delivery of social services (Rosales and
Valencia 2008). Thus, this measure provides information about the extent to which local
governments administer services that are usually reserved for the state and/or national
levels of government.
I also control for a number of potentially confounding variables. (See Appendix A for
summary statistics and sources of data.) The number of municipalities in each country
per million residents is included to capture how each country is divided into local polit-
5See the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) data repository for
information about data availability at http://data.imf.org.
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ical units. Increasing the overall number of places in which women could potentially be
represented might have a positive effect on women’s local representation. As the number
of political offices at the local level increases, so might women’s opportunities for repre-
sentation since research suggests that women do better in elections when there are more
seats open (e.g. large district magnitude versus single-member districts; legislatures ver-
sus executives). I include a count of the number of years since the first local elections were
held after the most recent episode of authoritarianism ended. More experience with local
elections should have a positive effect on women’s representation since men might first
seek access to local elected offices and then later “let the ladder down" to women.
I also include controls for whether the mayor is elected indirectly (through the city
council) or directly (listed separately on the ballot) and whether a gender quota exists at the
local level. Direct election of the mayor is another way to measure the political autonomy
of local executives. Mayors that are elected in conjunction with the city council might have
less autonomy than mayors who are directly elected. Thus, we might expect the mayor’s
office to be a more desirable position in countries where the mayor is directly elected
versus those that are indirectly elected through the city council. Adopting gender quotas at
the national level of government has proven to be effective in electing women to national
legislatures, and thus adopting gender quotas at the local level is expected to improve
women’s local level representation. To measure levels of development in each country, I
include the female labor force participation rate, the percentage of a country’s population
living in urban areas, and national gross domestic product per capita. I expect women’s
local representation to increase as the level of development in each country increases.
Finally, to capture potentially diffusion effects, I control for the percent women in the
lower (or single) house of the national legislature, the percent women in the other local
institution (i.e., the percent women in executive offices for the legislature model, and the
percent women in legislatures for the executive model), and a lagged dependent variable
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(the average percent women in each institution in the previous electoral term).
2.4 Analyses and Results
The results of two ordinary least squares regression models with robust standard errors
are presented in Table 2.1. Column 1 of Table 2.1 presents the results for the model ex-
plaining the percent women in local legislative councils. The results suggest that increas-
ing local political power by allowing subnational governments to create legislation without
the possibility of federal review has no statistically significant effect on the percentage of
women in local legislative councils. However, increasing local fiscal powers—by allowing
local governments to create new taxes—and increasing local administrative powers—by
devolving administrative responsibility for a number of social services—has a negative
effect on women’s local legislative representation. Substantively, providing local govern-
ments with the power to create new taxes results in about 6 percentage points less women
in local legislatures. Additionally, for every social service that is decentralized, the average
percent women in local legislatures decreases by 1.352 percentage points. This means that
women’s local legislative representation in a country with the highest levels of fiscal and
administrative decentralization is expected to be about 14 percentage points lower than
women’s representation in a country with no fiscal and administrative decentralization,
all else equal.6 This finding is especially notable given that the average percent women
councilors across the sample is just 22.1%.
Column 2 of Table 2.1 presents results for the model explaining women’s representa-
tion in local executive offices. The results suggest that, contrary to the results for women
local legislators, increasing local political, fiscal, and/or administrative powers does not
have a statistically significant effect on the percentage of women local elected executives.
These findings – or rather lack of findings – might indicate that women have limited access
6Calculated by adding the effect for fiscal decentralization (a dichotomous indicator) to the effect for
administrative decentralization times six (since this variable ranges from zero to six).
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to local executive offices even in very centralized countries where local governments do
not hold much power relative to the national level of government. Additionally, the limited
amount of variance in the dependent variable (only one country, Uruguay in 2010, exceeds
an average of 12.5% women executives) might also make it difficult to tease out the effects
of decentralization on women’s representation as local executives.
To further illustrate the substantive significance of these results, Figure 2.3 presents a
bar graph of predicted levels of women’s average representation in local legislatures and
local executive offices under different levels of political, fiscal, and administrative decen-
tralization with 90% confidence intervals. The heights of the lighter gray bars representing
women mayors don’t change much across the different scenarios, echoing the insignificant
results presented in column 2 of Table 2.1. Across the different combinations of decen-
tralization, women’s average predicted level of representation as executives is less than
10%.
However, the dark gray bars representing women in local legislative councils vary quite
a bit across the scenarios. Women’s predicted level of representation in local legislative
councils is highest—over 30%—when political, fiscal, and administrative decentraliza-
tion are low. This value begins to decrease as each aspect of decentralization increases
until women’s local legislative representation reaches its lowest predicted value—around
15%—under the scenario when political decentralization is low, and fiscal and administra-
tive decentralization are high. This means that women’s predicted level of representation
in local legislatures is more than doubled in countries with low levels of decentralization
compared to those with high levels of fiscal and administrative decentralization, all else
equal. It is worth noting, however, that the 90% error bars overlap for all scenarios except
the first one (low political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization) indicating that the
predicted level of women’s local legislative representation is somewhere between 12.1%
and 26.4% when at least one aspect of decentralization is high, but upwards of 28.2% to
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Table 2.1: Does Decentralization Hinder Women’s Local Representation?
(1) (2)
% Council % Mayors
Local Lawmaking Autonomy 0.064 2.264
(1.469) (1.391)
Local New Tax -6.002** 2.888
(2.082) (2.386)
Local Social Services -1.352* 0.731
(0.523) (0.486)
# Muni per Million 0.104y -0.069
(0.061) (0.048)
Yrs Local Elections 0.270** -0.085
(0.097) (0.076)
Mayor Indirectly Elected -2.823 0.631
(2.402) (1.350)
Local Quota 0.685 2.222
(2.065) (1.660)
Female Labor Participation 0.035 -0.000
(0.159) (0.073)
% Urban Pop 0.465** -0.139
(0.146) (0.133)
GDP per Capita -0.001* 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
% Women Nat Legislature 0.211 0.051
(0.323) (0.107)
% Women Mayors 0.333
(0.207)
Prev % Women Council 0.156
(0.285)
% Women Council 0.101
(0.067)
Prev % Women Mayors 0.498y
(0.277)
Constant -20.869y 7.039
(10.424) (7.634)
R-squared 0.767 0.533
Observations 54 54
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
yp<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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32.9% when all aspects of decentralization are low. The best case scenario for women’s
local legislative representation clearly appears to be when all aspects of decentralization
are at their lowest values.
Figure 2.3: Predicted Percent Women Across Levels of Decentralization
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Note: Low (high) values of political and fiscal decentralization are when these variables are equal to zero
(one). Low (high) values of administrative decentralization are when local social services is less (more)
than two, which is below (above) the 50% percentile of this variable. Once category is missing due to a
lack of observations with these characteristics (P low, F high, A low). 90% confidence intervals shown.
In terms of the control variables, it appears that increases in the number of municipali-
ties per residents, greater experience with local elections, and higher levels of urbanization
work to promote women’s local legislative representation, while increases in national GDP
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per capita reduce women’s presence on legislative councils. These findings suggest that
increasing the number of venues for representation (by increasing the number of munic-
ipalities) increases not only women’s potential for representation, but their actual levels
of representation as well. Similarly, as local governments’ experience with democratic
elections increases, women’s legislative representation increases as well. Higher levels
of development, when measured through urbanization, lead to increases in women’s local
legislative representation. However, higher levels of GDP per capita lead to decreases in
the average percent women in local councils. This finding could be an indication that as
a country grows in overall wealth and power, political offices become more attractive to
male candidates, again making it more difficult for women to gain representation.
For the second model explaining the average percent women in local executive of-
fices, none of the variables included in the model are statistically significant except for the
lagged dependent variable, despite the model explaining around 53% of the variance in the
dependent variable. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable suggests that having
women mayors in the previous term increases women’s chances of being represented in
executive offices in future electoral terms.
2.5 Conclusions
Does decentralization hinder women’s representation at the local level? Evidence from
the empirical models presented herein suggests that decentralization may impede women’s
representation on local legislative councils and does not help to improve women’s repre-
sentation as local chief executives. I find that as local powers—especially local fiscal and
administrative powers—increase, women’s representation in local legislatures decreases.
Given the increased importance of local governments for policymaking, economic out-
comes, and the delivery of public services, it is important that women are represented in
local political institutions and are able to provide input into local political processes. Since
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men continue to dominate local political institutions, they have nearly exclusive control
over the design and implementation of public policy as well as the resources that accom-
pany positions of power (UNDP 2013). This means that women’s voices are likely not
being heard and women’s perspectives might not be included in deliberations about policy
and other political decisions. This is problematic not only from a normative perspective,
but also from a policy one as numerous studies show that increasing women’s represen-
tation in local governments leads to better policy outcomes for women (for example, see
Bratton and Ray 2002; Holman 2014b; Meier and Funk 2017; Smith 2014).
Local governments matter for the lives of women. They shape opportunities for de-
scriptive and substantive representation, create policies with gendered consequences, and
administer social services largely consumed by women. Local governments are also ar-
gued to be more accessible to women than higher levels of government and may act as
a launchpad for women’s political careers. If women can’t gain entry into local political
offices, they may be barred from politics altogether. The finding that women’s local rep-
resentation is shaped by the amount of power decentralized to local governments helps
in solving the puzzle of why women continue to be underrepresented even at the local
level. By increasing the power and desirability of local offices, decentralization appears to
perpetuate and may even exacerbate women’s underrepresentation in local politics.
Perhaps the solution to this problem is to re-centralize political, fiscal, and adminis-
trative powers back to the national level of government. However, this solution—while it
may lead to higher gender representation at the local level—is unlikely to benefit women
in the long-run or increase the representation of women’s substantive interests. Simply
overturning decentralization altogether avoids the problem, rather than fixing it. In other
words, reversing decentralization will not help women gain representation in meaning-
ful political institutions. Better solutions to the problem of women’s underrepresentation
in positions of power might include providing women with access to political networks
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and resources that can help them compete in elections for powerful offices, encouraging
women to run for office and encouraging voters to support women candidates, and imple-
menting affirmative action policies like gender quotas that can subvert gender hierarchies
and other informal institutions that impede women’s local representation.
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3. RUNNING ON A LEDGE: WOMEN MAYORAL CANDIDATES AND THE
GLASS CLIFF IN BRAZIL
Though women are beginning to break through the glass ceiling and secure leadership
positions in more countries around the world, recent research suggests that women lead-
ers may face another obstacle to their career success: the “glass cliff." The glass cliff is a
term coined by Ryan and Haslam (2005) to describe the phenomenon of women (and other
historically underrepresented groups) being selected to fill precarious leadership positions.
Research on the glass cliff suggests that the playing field on the other side of the glass ceil-
ing may not be even for men and women. Women, more oftentimes than men, are selected
for leadership positions under conditions of crisis, uncertainty, and declining performance.
Evidence of the glass cliff has been found in several contexts, including leadership roles in
corporate settings (e.g. board members and CEOs) and in political contexts (e.g. electoral
candidacies and party leadership posts).
Several factors have been argued to cause the glass cliff (Ryan and Haslam 2007).
Women may be selected for high-risk positions because they are seen as more expendable
or their careers are perceived to be less valuable. Other arguments suggest that quali-
fied men are likely to avoid glass cliff positions, leaving women to fill these risky and
less desirable posts. More innocuous explanations of the glass cliff indicate that views
about women’s abilities to handle crisis situations and perceptions of these positions as
opportunities for women might also be causes of the glass cliff. Women themselves may
view glass cliff appointments as opportunities for advancement, and so they self-select into
these positions. Finally, organizations in decline might choose a woman to fill a high-rank
position because the organization wants to signal that it is changing and expects a woman
to offer new leadership strategies.
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Glass cliff positions often prove to be stressful, insecure posts that pose a high risk of
failure. Regardless of the cause, if women continue to fill precarious leadership positions
at a higher rate than men, then women’s abilities to be successful leaders will be called
into question. The glass cliff can be detrimental to the career trajectories of women in
these positions and may have a negative impact on views of women’s role in society more
generally. Any or all of the potential causes of the glass cliff may be accurate; however,
determining which mechanism is at play in various contexts is beyond the scope of this
project. Rather, the purpose of the current study is to expand on ambiguous theoretical
expectations offered by the glass cliff theory and examine the glass cliff in ideal govern-
ments, studied through the use of Brazilian municipalities.
Using data from 2004 - 2012, I analyze whether women are more likely to receive
nomination for mayoral elections in Brazil when their party is in a weak position or when
economic conditions in their district are undesirable. Many factors, such as these, have
been classified as glass cliff positions in the literature. However, no study to date has con-
sidered whether non-political, as well as political, factors affect whether women electoral
candidates will be selected for more precarious positions. Because of this, studies of the
glass cliff in political contexts cannot fully explain whether certain candidates are more
likely than others to face glass cliffs. This study explores the multidimensionality of the
glass cliff by examining whether women candidates are more likely than men to take on
precarious and less desirable positions, conceptualized in both political and non-political
terms.
Below, I provide a review of studies on the glass cliff and summarize potential causes
of the glass cliff that have been suggested by the literature. Then, I expand on the glass cliff
theory by highlighting shortcomings of the current literature and offering more nuanced
expectations that take into consideration how political and budgetary factors might impact
the selection of women candidates. Next, I examine how multiple dimensions of the glass
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cliff impact the nomination of women within the context of Brazilian mayoral elections.
Empirical results suggest that parties are more likely to select a woman candidate when
the party is in a weak position (i.e. competing against an incumbent or incumbent party) or
when the electoral district is less desirable (i.e. district with a small budget or decreasing
budget). This study concludes that women candidates are more likely than men to confront
a political glass cliff – even in a multiparty system where party organizations are weakly
institutionalized and women (and men) can easily switch from one party to another.
3.1 The Glass Cliff
The glass cliff theory suggests that women and other historically underrepresented
groups, such as minorities (Cook and Glass 2013; Kulich, Ryan and Haslam 2014) and
the disabled (Wilson-Kovacs et al. 2008), are more likely to hold leadership positions that
may be considered precarious in some way. Research on the glass cliff has been conducted
primarily within the context of private organizations; however, evidence of the glass cliff
has been found in political contexts as well. In the private sphere, research has found that
women are more likely to be selected for leadership positions (e.g. board member or CEO)
when the company is performing poorly on one or more dimensions. Qualitative research
conducted by Ryan, Haslam and Postmes (2007) shed light on the types of glass cliffs that
women feel they face in their ascension up the corporate ladder, such as limited resources,
a lack of opportunities, and insufficient support systems. However, this research also found
that some respondents, especially men, doubt the existence and potential dangers of the
glass cliff. Whether women in leadership posts are likely to find themselves on a glass cliff
is still a debated topic in the literature (Adams, Gupta and Leeth 2009; Cook and Glass
2014; Haslam et al. 2010; Ryan and Haslam 2009).
Nevertheless, evidence of the glass cliff has been found through experimental and ob-
servational studies in a variety of empirical settings. Research on corporations in the U.K.
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found that women are more likely to be appointed to company boards during a time of
financial downturn (Ryan and Haslam 2005). Qualitative interviews with women in the
information technology sector also revealed evidence of the glass cliff, with women lead-
ers expressing concerns about the precariousness of their leadership positions (Wilson-
Kovacs, Ryan and Haslam 2006). Indications of the glass cliff have also surfaced for
women in distributive and constituent policy agencies in the U.S. Senior Executive Ser-
vice (Sabharwal 2015).
Experimental studies of the glass cliff find that participants are often more likely to
select a woman candidate over an equally qualified man to fill a high-risk position. In an
experiment with law students, Ashby, Ryan and Haslam (2006) found that students were
more likely to assign a problematic legal case with a high risk of failure to a woman lawyer.
The same phenomenon was found in 3 additional studies conducted by Haslam & Ryan
(Haslam and Ryan 2008). In these experiments, management graduates (study 1), high
school students (study 2), and business leaders (study 3) were more likely to select a female
candidate over a male to lead a hypothetical organization (international firm or music
festival) when its performance was in decline rather than improving. In a later experiment,
Bruckmüller and Branscombe (2010) found that participants frequently selected a woman
over a man to be CEO of a hypothetical food company whose performance was declining.
Indications of the glass cliff have been identified in political settings as well. Beckwith
(2009, 2014) argues that women are more likely to contest for party leadership when cri-
sis circumstances, such as a scandal or major election failure, remove male party leaders
or when conditions of uncertainty cause quality male candidates to defer their candidacy.
Research on candidate selection suggests that women electoral candidates are more likely
to be selected by their parties to contest elections that the party has a small chance of
winning.1 Evidence of a political glass cliff has been found in the United States, with
1Women in these positions are also referred to as “sacrificial lambs" by the literature.
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both Democratic and Republican parties selecting women to contest elections for the U.S.
House of Representatives (1916 - 1978) when their party was unlikely to win (Gertzog
and Simard 1981). The same was found for women gubernatorial candidates in the Re-
publican party from 1976 to 2004 (Stambough and O’Regan 2007). In U.K. parliamentary
elections (from 2001 to 2010), women candidates received a much smaller portion of the
vote than male candidates precisely because they were selected to contest seats that were
significantly less winnable (Ryan, Haslam and Kulich 2010).2 Research also found that
women candidates in Canadian federal elections from 2004 - 2011 competed in districts
where they were more likely to lose and women incumbents’ seats are often not as safe as
men’s (Thomas and Bodet 2013).
Many explanations have been offered to account for the glass cliff phenomenon (Ryan
and Haslam 2007). Some argue that the glass cliff is caused by overt sexism and discrimi-
nation against women. These arguments suggest that women are seen as more expendable
or less valuable in the organization because their income is considered supplemental to
their husband’s and they can opt out of the workforce (Ryan and Haslam 2006; Ryan,
Haslam and Postmes 2007). This view makes it easier for organizations to place blame for
failure on women rather than men (Ryan et al. 2011). Other research has argued that in-
formal institutional norms, such as in-group favoritism, cause quality men to refrain from
accepting a precarious position because more attractive ones will be available to them in
the future. This leaves risky and less desirable leadership positions open for women to fill
(Ashby, Ryan and Haslam 2006; Ryan, Haslam and Postmes 2007).
More benign causes of the glass cliff have been attributed to several factors, including
stereotypes about women’s “unique" leadership skills and abilities to handle stressful, cri-
sis situations (Haslam and Ryan 2008; Ryan et al. 2011). Women might also be placed in
2Kulich, Ryan and Haslam (2014) find that black and minority ethnic candidates from the Conservative
Party in the U.K. also contest seats that are harder to win than candidates from the majority ethnic group.
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these positions because they are viewed as opportunities for women to “prove themselves"
or advance within the organization. Women themselves may see these positions as an op-
portunity to advance their careers, so they self-select into glass cliff positions (Beckwith
2009). Another explanation of the glass cliff may be that poorly performing organizations
want to signal that they are changing and improving, so they choose a woman leader in
hopes that she will bring a unique set of management skills to the organization (Bruck-
müller and Branscombe 2010).
3.2 The Multidimensionality of the Glass Cliff
The glass cliff theory was first developed through research on corporations.3 It has
since been applied to other empirical contexts, including NCAA basketball teams (Cook
and Glass 2013), legal settings (Ashby, Ryan and Haslam 2006), service-providing agen-
cies (Sabharwal 2015), and political candidacies (Ryan, Haslam and Kulich 2010). I argue
that the application of the glass cliff theory to political settings leads to ambiguous theoret-
ical expectations that call for further explanation. Research on the private sector suggests
that women face a glass cliff when they assume leadership positions in organizations that
are performing poorly or for organizations that are undesirable. Research on politics sug-
gests that women face a glass cliff when they are nominated by their party for “hopeless"
elections. However, no study thus far has considered whether woman electoral candi-
dates face glass cliffs on non-political as well as political dimensions. Since the current
literature does not adequately define which dimensions may constitute a “glass cliff" for
political candidates, it is unclear whether women political candidates are more likely than
men to be placed in precarious leadership positions.
The arguments posited by research on women in political settings lead to the expecta-
tion that a woman candidate is more likely to be nominated than a man when the party is
3See Ryan and Haslam (2005) for the first study.
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in a weak position (hypothesis 1).4 Past research on the glass cliff in the U.S. and the U.K.
has found that women are more likely to be chosen by their parties to contest elections that
they have a low probability of winning. If this finding is generalizable to other political
contexts, then indicators of a party’s electoral strength, such as vote shares or incumbency,
should be significant in explaining the nomination of women candidates. Other research
suggests that women are more likely than men to be chosen for undesirable leadership po-
sitions, such as CEO of a company whose performance is declining or for an organization
in crisis. Applying this argument to the context of political candidates leads to the expec-
tation that a woman candidate is more likely to be nominated than a man when economic
conditions in the district are undesirable or declining (hypothesis 2). Women candidates
may face glass cliffs on political as well as non-political dimensions. Exploring multiple
aspects of women’s candidacies is essential in order to determine whether women electoral
candidates are more likely to be set up for failure and in which areas they are most likely
to fail (or to be blamed for past failures - see Ryan and Haslam 2005).
3.3 Exploring the Glass Cliff in Brazilian Municipalities
I explore the multidimensionality of the glass cliff theory within the context of Brazil-
ian mayoral elections. The Brazilian case provides an interesting setting to explore the
glass cliff for several reasons. Since Brazil’s party system is weakly institutionalized and
highly fragmented (Mainwaring 1999), politicians are able to switch party affiliations eas-
ily and frequently do so (Desposato 2006).5 Over thirty political parties compete at the
local level in Brazil (see Table 3.1) and as many as 15 candidates may compete in a single
mayoral race.6 This provides potential women candidates with more opportunities to get
4This expectation rests on the assumption that district magnitude equals one and parties can only nomi-
nate one candidate.
5Brazilian law requires candidates to run on a party ticket, be a member of that party for at least one year
prior to the election, and live in their constituency for one year prior to the election.
6The municipality of São Paulo had 15 candidates run for mayor in the 2000 election.
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their names on the ballot compared to women in other countries and should allow women
the option to remove themselves from weak parties if they so choose. However, having
more party options doesn’t guarantee that Brazilian women will be able to easily secure
nomination for competitive political parties.
Legislative candidates in Brazil have been characterized as highly entrepreneurial and
are known to self-select into parties (Desposato 2006; Samuels 2008). Party leaders are
thought to have little control over the nomination process for legislative elections and
virtually anyone who wants to compete can find a party organization to support them.
However, this is not the case for candidates seeking to compete for executive posts in
Brazil.7 The selection process for executive races, such as state governor, “can be very
contentious" (Power and Mochel 2008, 237). Gubernatorial hopefuls are often denied
nomination by their parties (Power and Mochel 2008) because executive offices are highly
sought after in Brazil (Samuels 2003). “Candidate selection for all candidates begins at
the local (district or município) level. Local party conventions directly chose the local
directorate, delegates to the state convention, the slate for councillors, and the candidates
for mayor and vice mayor. This arrangement gives party members complete control of
candidate selection at the local level" (Mainwaring 1999, 252).
Municipalities in Brazil are highly decentralized (Falleti 2010), providing mayors with
substantial control over policy decisions and the allocation of resources. Mayors are pow-
erful actors and ambitious politicians in Brazil often compete for mayoral office even while
they are serving in the national legislature (Samuels 2003). Though there have been few
empirical studies on candidate selection at the municipal level,8 the work of Mainwaring
(1999) suggests that nomination processes for mayoral races in Brazil are competitive and
7This is not unique to Brazil. Hinojosa and Franceschet (2012) argue that electoral rules have different
effects on executive and legislative positions, and that the “glass ceiling" for executive posts is harder to
break.
8For examples, see Álvares (2008); Felisbino, Bernabel and Kerbauy (2012); Fleischer (2002); Miguel
and Queiroz (2006).
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are not wide open, as are legislative races. Each party can only select one candidate to
compete in the mayoral election, so it is difficult for aspiring politicians to secure nomina-
tions – especially for competitive parties.
Table 3.1 lists the percentage of women candidates from each party for the 2004, 2008,
and 2012 mayoral elections. The table suggests that parties from both sides of the ideo-
logical spectrum nominate roughly equal percentages of women candidates for mayoral
races. Furthermore, difference of means tests indicate that there are no statistically signifi-
cant differences between the number of women candidates nominated by left, center, right,
and unclassified parties (see table 3.2). Women candidates tend to be slightly younger than
men and more educated. Both men and women candidates are likely to be married, though
greater proportions of single, divorced, and widowed women run for mayor than men of
the same civil status. Men and women mayoral candidates have roughly equal levels of
previous political experience. A larger percentage of women candidates run in less devel-
oped regions of Brazil (North, Northeast), whereas men candidates are more likely to run
in the wealthier regions (South, Southeast).
3.4 Data, Measurement, and Methodological Approach
I use a series of logistic regression models to test whether a woman candidate is more
likely to be nominated for a glass cliff position than a man candidate. The data cover
the three most recent municipal elections in Brazil (2004, 2008, 2012) and the unit of
analysis is the party (see Appendix B for summary statistics). The dependent variable
is coded 1 if the party selected a woman candidate to compete in the election for mayor
and 0 if the candidate was a man. Given that multiple dimensions are hypothesized to
affect the selection of women, I use measures of a party’s electoral strength and district
economic conditions to test whether women confront glass cliffs on multiple (political and
non-political) dimensions.
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Table 3.1: Percentage of Women Mayoral Candidates in Brazil by Party
Party Party Name in English Ideology 2004 2008 2012
PCB Brazilian Communist Party Left 0% 5.4% 5.9%
PSTU United Socialist Workers’ Party Left 17.8% 18.8% 16.7%
PSOL Socialism & Freedom Party Left – 12.1% 6.7%
PC do B Communist Party of Brazil Left 12.0% 12.6% 13.9%
PMN Party of National Mobilization Left 6.2% 13.1% 8.7%
PV Green Party Left 12.4% 13.1% 14.8%
PPS Socialist People’s Party Left 8.6% 10.7% 13.8%
PSB Brazilian Socialist Party Left 10.1% 11.4% 14.0%
PDT Democratic Labor Party Left 8.5% 9.7% 11.7%
PT Worker’s Party Left 11.1% 11.1% 13.2%
PSDB Brazilian Social Democracy Party Center 8.6% 10.9% 14.3%
PMDB Brazilian Democratic Movement Party Center 8.6% 11.1% 13.6%
PSL Social Liberal Party Right 7.4% 9.7% 13.0%
PSC Socialist Christian Party Right 10.7% 5.9% 13.9%
PSD Social Democratic Party Right – – 15.1%
PRONA* Reconstruction of National Order Party Right 14.3% – –
PL* Liberal Party Right 9.96% – –
PR* Party of the Republic Right – 12.9% 13.9%
DEM/PFL Democrats (f. Liberal Front Party) Right 9.2% 13.2% 13.4%
PTB Brazilian Labor Party Right 9.7% 11.9% 14.2%
PP/PPB (Brazilian) Progressive Party Right 7.9% 10.6% 13.3%
PCO** Workers’ Cause Party Unclassified 23.3% 44.4% 50%
PAN Party of the Nation’s Retirees Unclassified 5.1% – –
PPL Free Homeland Party Unclassified – – 14.3%
PTN National Labor Party Unclassified 7.6% 12.5% 13.9%
PSDC Christian Social Democratic Party Unclassified 8.7% 8.2% 13.1%
PRTB Brazilian Labor Renewal Party Unclassified 18.4% 9.4% 18.0%
PTC Christian Labor Party Unclassified 11.7% 12.0% 13.6%
PHS Humanist Party of Solidarity Unclassified 12.5% 11.5% 15.4%
PT do B Labor Party of Brazil Unclassified 6.6% 12.5% 11.7%
PRP Progressive Republican Party Unclassified 10.8% 3.6% 10.8%
PRB Brazilian Republican Party Unclassified – 13.3% 12.8%
N Parties: 32 % Women: 9.4% 11.3% 13.5%
**The PCO appears to have high gender equality. However, only 30 candidates competed in 2004, 9 in
2008, and 4 in 2012. *PRONA and PL merged in 2006 to create the PR. Data are from the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral. Parties’ ideologies are classified based on Power and Zucco (2009, 2012), Mainwaring
(1999), and Rodrigues (2002).
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Table 3.2: Comparing Men and Women Mayoral Candidates
Women Men
Average Age* 46.76 48.45
Average Education*# 6.12 5.42
Percent Single* 18.15% 12.96%
Percent Married* 64.68% 76.80%
Percent Divorced/Separated* 11.38% 8.96%
Percent Widowed* 5.69% 1.14%
Pct. with Political Experience 14.68% 14.21%
Pct. from Left Party 34.00% 33.76%
Pct. from Center Party 27.02% 27.93%
Pct. from Right Party 32.58% 32.44%
Pct. from Unclassified Party 6.40% 5.86%
Pct. from North Region* 9.42% 7.65%
Pct. from Northeast Region* 38.44% 29.03%
Pct. from Central West Region 8.58% 8.13%
Pct. from South Region* 14.88% 21.57%
Pct. from Southeast Region* 28.68% 33.62%
*Indicates a statistically significant difference between men and
women at the 99% level. #The education variable ranges from 1
(incomplete primary) to 7 (complete tertiary). Elections included
from 2004, 2008, and 2012.
I use four variables to measure a party’s electoral strength: whether the candidate is
running against the incumbent mayor,9 or against the incumbent party, the party’s vote
share in the previous mayoral election, and the party’s vote share in the current elec-
tion.10 Incumbency has been argued to disadvantage women (Schwindt-Bayer 2005) and
this measure has been used in previous studies of the glass cliff (Kulich, Ryan and Haslam
2014; Ryan, Haslam and Kulich 2010; Stambough and O’Regan 2007). Vote shares have
also been used in previous studies of the glass cliff as measures of party strength (Gert-
zog and Simard 1981; Thomas and Bodet 2013). These measures are useful because they
provide some indication about the party’s probability of winning the election and whether
9Brazilian mayors are elected to 4-year terms and are limited to one immediate reelection.
10Parties that did not compete in the previous election are coded as having received 0% of the past vote
share. Both past and current vote share measures are from the final election round.
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the party can be viewed as a competitive contender. If parties that are more disadvan-
taged electorally are also more likely to nominate women, this may provide indication that
women are likely to face political glass cliffs.
To measure the desirability of a district in terms of its economic conditions, I use the
size of the municipal budget, the change in the size of the budget (the year before the
election and over 4 years), and the size of the budget per capita. Municipalities in Brazil
vary greatly in their size, wealth, and levels of development. Budgetary indicators are
useful measures of the performance (or desirability) of a municipality because they capture
the amount of resources available in the municipality and how these resources change over
time. Presumably, municipalities with larger size budgets or municipalities with large
increases in their budgets are more desirable places to govern than poorer municipalities.
If women are more likely to be nominated to run in municipalities that are less desirable
in terms of their budget conditions, this may be an indication that women candidates can
face glass cliffs on non-political dimensions as well.
Each model also controls for party ideology and municipal-level variables that may
impact the selection of women candidates. Party ideology is coded by the author as left,
center, right, or unclassified based on the works of Power and Zucco (2009, 2012), Main-
waring (1999), and Rodrigues (2002) (see Table 3.1). Municipal level controls include
the size of the municipality, the percentage of the electorate that is female, the average
age and education level of the electorate, whether the municipality is eligible for a run-off
election,11 whether the incumbent mayor is a woman, the number of candidates competing
in the election, and the number of women competing in the election. Finally, fixed effects
for regions and years are also included.
11Municipalities with greater than 200,000 inhabitants are eligible for a run-off election if a single candi-
date did not receive a majority (>50%) of the votes. Candidates in municipalities less than 200,000 people
win by a simple plurality of votes.
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3.5 Empirical Analyses and Results
Table 3.3 and table 3.4 present the results of eight logistic models. The models pre-
sented in table 3.3 use four measures of a party’s electoral prospects to determine whether
women are more likely to receive nomination for parties that are at a disadvantage. Model
results indicate that women are more likely to be selected to compete against an incum-
bent mayor (model 1), against an incumbent party (model 2), or when the party receives a
smaller portion of the vote share in the current election (model 4). However, the vote share
measure for the previous election does not have a statistically significant effect. Given that
the past and current vote share measures are correlated at just 0.36, a party’s performance
in the pervious election may not be a good predictor of how the party will fare in the
current election. But, if parties have a good sense about the amount of votes they expect
to receive, then this should impact their choice of candidates. So, the current vote share
measure – though it technically occurs after candidate nomination – may be a more useful
proxy for the information that parties have about their electoral strength than the past vote
share measure. Given that about 62% of incumbent mayors are successfully reelected to a
second term in office, women candidates competing against an incumbent are more likely
to lose the election and, thus, face a huge glass cliff. Candidates from the incumbent party
are also likely to win (about 55% do), so the finding that women are more likely than men
to be selected to compete against an incumbent party also provides indication that women
candidates face a political glass cliff.
Table 3.4 presents models that use various measures of the desirability of a district in
terms of its economic conditions. The results suggest that women candidates are more
likely to run in municipalities that have smaller sized budgets (model 5) or in municipal-
ities where the budget is not increasing, measured in both 1-year (model 6) and 4-year
(model 7) increments. However, the coefficient for the budget per capita variable (model
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Table 3.3: Women’s Nominations Under Different Political Conditions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Against Incumbent Mayor 0.216*** – – –
(0.053) – – –
Against Incumbent Party – 0.126** – –
– (0.042) – –
Past Vote Share – – -0.000 –
– – (0.001) –
Current Vote Share – – – -0.008***
– – – (0.001)
Left Party 0.004 0.001 0.007 -0.061
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Right Party 0.015 0.013 0.014 -0.004
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Unclassified Party -0.119 -0.116 -0.109 -0.217*
(0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Population (logged) -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
% Female in Electorate 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Avg. Education of Electorate 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.063
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Avg. Age Group of Electorate -0.036 -0.058 -0.048 -0.039
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Possibility of Run-off -0.265 -0.252 -0.268 -0.135
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147)
Prev. Mayor Woman 0.083 0.097 0.110 0.112*
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
No. Candidates -0.583*** -0.586*** -0.578*** -0.638***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
No. Women Candidates 3.242*** 3.239*** 3.235*** 3.243***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant -3.024*** -2.934*** -2.973*** -2.467***
(0.702) (0.701) (0.701) (0.706)
Pseudo R2 0.388 0.388 0.387 0.389
N Candidates 41,114 41,114 41,114 41,114
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Region and year dummies are included, but not reported here.
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8) is not statistically significant. These findings indicate that not only do women candi-
dates face glass cliffs on political dimensions, but they are also likely to face challenges
on non-political dimensions as well (economic/budgetary conditions in this case).
Regarding the control variables, interestingly, the party’s ideological disposition does
not seem to impact the selection of women candidates. Left (right) parties are no more or
less likely than center parties to nominate a woman candidate.12 Women are less likely to
be nominated when a large number of candidates is competing in the election; however,
they are more likely to be nominated when other women are competing in the same elec-
tion, suggesting that there may be contagion or diffusion effects that should be explored
further. Other characteristics of municipalities, such as population, whether the previous
mayor was a woman, whether the municipality is eligible for a run-off election, the percent
women in the electorate, or the average age and education level of the electorate, appear
to have no statistically significant effect on the selection of women candidates.
The results of these analyses suggest that women are likely to face glass cliffs in Brazil-
ian mayoral elections and that these glass cliffs exist on multiple dimensions. Women are
more likely to be selected to contest elections when their party is competing against an
incumbent mayor or an incumbent party, or when their party receives less than 40% of the
vote share in the current election. Budgetary factors also appear to impact the selection of
women candidates. Women are more likely to compete in less desirable municipalities –
e.g. municipalities with smaller size budgets or with decreasing budgets.
3.6 Conclusions
Are women more likely than men to be put in precarious leadership positions? The
results of this study suggest that the answer to this question is yes – at least in the context
of Brazilian mayoral elections. Evidence of the glass cliff has surfaced in a variety of
12However, the category for unclassified parties is negative and statistically significant in model 4.
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Table 3.4: Women’s Nominations Under Different Budgetary Conditions
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Size of Budget (millions) -0.0001*** – – –
(0.00002) – – –
1-year  in Budget (millions) – -0.001*** – –
– (0.0001) – –
4-year  in Budget (millions) – – -0.0002*** –
– – (0.00005) –
Budget per Capita – – – 0.000
– – – (0.000)
Left Party 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.013
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Right Party 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.018
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Unclassified Party -0.096 -0.099 -0.096 -0.101
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Population (logged) 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.006
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
% Female in Electorate 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Avg. Education of Electorate 0.049 0.042 0.049 0.056
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066)
Avg. Age Group of Electorate -0.019 -0.007 -0.018 -0.043
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144)
Possibility of Run-off -0.155 -0.139 -0.150 -0.276
(0.147) (0.148) (0.147) (0.147)
Prev. Mayor Woman 0.112 0.111 0.112 0.109
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
No. Candidates -0.564*** -0.559*** -0.564*** -0.577***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No. Women Candidates 3.243*** 3.250*** 3.244*** 3.236***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant -3.014*** -3.069*** -3.013*** -3.023***
(0.701) (0.704) (0.701) (0.714)
Pseudo R2 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.387
N Candidates 41,114 40,814 41,114 41,114
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Region and year dummies are included, but not reported here.
63
countries and contexts, and Brazilian local governments appear to be no exception. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that a woman is more likely to be selected to compete against an
incumbent (or incumbent party) or when her party receives less than 40% of the vote share,
across almost all levels of district performance. There is also evidence that women are less
likely to compete in wealthy municipalities or municipalities whose budgets are increas-
ing, suggesting that political candidates can face glass cliffs on non-political dimensions
as well.
This study expanded on the glass cliff literature by exposing the multidimensionality
of glass cliff positions and examining two dimensions of the glass cliff – electoral strength
and district desirability – within a new empirical context. The findings of this study sug-
gest that both partisan and budgetary factors are significant in explaining the selection of
women candidates; however, whether this finding is generalizable to other contexts is an
empirical question that deserves attention. Future research on the glass cliff should con-
sider how multiple dimensions can affect the desirability of a certain position, and thus,
whether the position may be considered a “glass cliff" in some regard. There are multiple
aspects to all leadership positions. Some of these aspects may be more risky or uncertain
than others, and each one could impact the selection of women leaders and their probabil-
ity of success.
Research on gender and the selection of electoral candidates should examine whether
women are more likely than men to take on risky candidacies in different political con-
texts. Party systems, nomination procedures, election laws, and informal party norms are
likely to affect the probability with which women will face glass cliff positions. This study
found that women candidates are likely to face a political glass cliff, even in a weakly in-
stitutionalized, highly fragmented, multiparty system such as Brazil. Women competing
for legislative posts in multimember districts, or on open lists, may be less likely to face
glass cliffs because parties can select more than one candidate to compete in the election
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and women may have greater control over their own candidacies. However, women com-
peting in single-member districts or for executive positions may be more likely to confront
a glass cliff because parties can only select one candidate for these elections and executive
positions are often less numerous and more prestigious than legislative posts.
The glass cliff poses many challenges for women and increases the probability that
women will fail in their leadership roles. If women continue to fill precarious leadership
positions at a higher rate than men, then the capacities of women to be effective leaders
will be called into question. Glass cliff positions can be detrimental to the careers of
women in these positions and are likely to have a negative impact on the public’s view of
women’s roles in society. The logical next step is to examine whether women candidates
actually receive a smaller portion of the vote share due to their disadvantaged status or
whether women are more likely to be elected to less desirable offices. Previous research
finds that women mayoral candidates have been more successful at winning elections in
the less developed regions of Brazil (Miguel and Queiroz 2006), suggesting that political
glass cliffs may not only affect how well women perform in elections, but also how well
they are able to perform in political office and the types of political offices that are available
to women.
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4. GENDERED GOVERNING? WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP STYLES AND
PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL
Are women more likely to open avenues for citizen participation in the decision-
making process?1 Previous literature argues that the leadership styles of men and women
differ substantially (Burke and Collins 2001; Duerst-Lahti 1990; Eagly and Johnson 1990;
Gilligan 1982; Helgesen 1990; Stivers 2002). Such work suggests that women’s lead-
ership styles are more open, inclusive, and participatory. Whereas men tend to govern
in a more hierarchical and authoritative manner, women leaders tend to be more demo-
cratic and more likely to facilitate the incorporation of citizens into the decision-making
process. The purpose of this study is to test this argument empirically using objective
measures of leadership styles. The majority of the literature on gendered leadership uses
subjective (i.e. self-reported) measures obtained through small-N research methods based
on samples from the U.S. to examine gender differences in leadership styles. This may
be problematic for two reasons: (1) self-reported behaviors may not correspond with ob-
served behaviors and (2) it is questionable whether these findings generalize to women
leaders in other countries.
This study examines whether women elected officials are more likely than men to
increase citizen participation within the context of Brazilian local governments. If argu-
ments about the leadership styles of women are correct, then women mayors should be
more likely than men to open formal channels for popular participation. Since the re-
Reprinted with permission from “Gendered Governing? Women’s Leadership Styles and Participatory
Institutions in Brazil" by Funk, Kendall D., 2015. Political Research Quarterly 68(3):564-578, Copyright
2015 by SAGE Publications.
1I am thankful to Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Kenneth Meier, Manuel Teodoro, Claudia Avellaneda, and
Ricardo Gomes for useful comments on earlier versions of this project. I thank anonymous reviewers and
the editors of Political Research Quarterly for their comments which have improved this article significantly.
All remaining errors are my own. The data used for this study and replication code are available from the
author upon request.
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turn to democracy in 1985, the Brazilian government has advocated for increased citizen
participation in multiple aspects of government. This has led to the creation of several
participatory mechanisms, including the creation of participatory budgeting (orçamento
participativo) and municipal participatory policy councils (conselhos municipais). Partic-
ipatory institutions exist in nearly all of Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities and most munici-
palities have multiple institutions that facilitate participation in different areas. I use the
adoption of these participatory institutions as a measure of the mayor’s preferences to in-
crease citizen participation and to test whether the mayor’s gender is associated with a
certain style of leadership.
Empirical results suggest that the decision to increase participation in a certain pol-
icy area is more likely a strategic choice made by the mayor, rather than an expression
of an inherent style of leading. While women are not more likely than men to increase
participation in all policy areas, they may be more likely to initiate participation in policy
areas that are not stereotypically feminine. Findings from this study suggest that women
mayors are more likely to increase participation in a stereotypically masculine policy do-
main – sports. Results also suggest that men are more likely to initiate participation in
stereotypically feminine policy domains – women’s rights, children’s rights, and health-
care. Furthermore, mayors are less likely to adopt participatory institutions when they are
ineligible to run for reelection and more likely if they are from a left party, are highly
educated, or if they govern a municipality with a large, urban, or wealthy population or a
municipality that has a large number of NGOs.
Knowing whether different types of elected officials have distinct styles of leading is
important because these differences in style may ultimately result in differences in policy
outcomes. The way a leader leads might also impact public opinion, representation, and
the strength and legitimacy of democratic institutions. The results of this study suggest
that women’s styles of leadership are not inherently more inclusive than men’s; rather, the
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behaviors of both men and women appear to be determined by strategic choices. Both
men and women are likely to adopt participatory institutions in areas that appeal to con-
stituents of the opposite gender and disassociate the mayor with traditional gender stereo-
types. Other characteristics of the mayor, including ideology and education, along with the
mayor’s electoral concerns and incentives to adhere to public demands, appear to matter
more than gender for explaining the adoption of participatory institutions.
4.1 Gendered Differences in Leadership Styles
A substantial body of literature suggests that the leadership styles of men and women
differ on a number of dimensions, including the way that men and women communi-
cate, resolve conflicts, lead their organizations, and interact with their peers and their
subordinates. One subset of this literature suggests that women are more likely to pursue
transformational leadership over transactional or laissez-faire leadership styles. Whereas
transactional leadership approaches exchanges between leaders and subordinates as trans-
actions worthy of reward or punishment, transformational leadership seeks to transform
the interests of subordinates to reflect the interests of the group as a whole through the
pursuit of a common goal (Rosener 1990). Women leaders in many contexts have been
found to prefer transformational leadership, including women business leaders (Rosener
1990), women accountants (Burke and Collins 2001), women in laboratory experiments
and women in other organizational settings (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001; Eagly,
Johannesen-Schmidt and Van Engen 2003).
A second way that men and women leaders may differ is in the way they communi-
cate. Some research finds that men are more likely to dominate group deliberations by
taking more than their share of time to speak and interrupting more often than women
(Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012; Kathlene 1994; Mendelberg, Karpowitz and
Oliphant 2014). Women speak less than men in most settings (Karpowitz, Mendelberg
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and Shaker 2012), and men have been found to be more verbally aggressive as the propor-
tion of women in the group increases (Kathlene 1994). However, there is some evidence
that women speak at equal rates as men when they are a numerical majority or when
institutional rules promote equality in participation (Duerst-Lahti 1990; Funk and Taylor-
Robinson 2014; Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012; Mendelberg, Karpowitz and
Oliphant 2014).
Women leaders’ styles of communication are also argued to be more open, accessible,
and transparent. In a qualitative study of four women senior executives, Helgesen (1990)
found that these women made a deliberate effort to be accessible to their employees and
facilitated spaces for information sharing by structuring their organizations as networks in-
stead of hierarchies. Research on local governments found that women were more likely to
increase transparency and were more responsive to groups that were previously excluded
from the policymaking process (Flammang 1997, 235). A later study found that women
local officials were characterized as more open and accessible, and more likely to share
power and information (Beck 2001).
A third way that men and women leaders may differ is in the way they resolve con-
flicts. Some literature has found that women have more cooperative conflict resolution
behaviors that rely on compromise, collaboration, and accommodation (Rosenthal 2000).
However, other literature has found little to no differences in men’s and women’s ap-
proaches to resolving conflicts (Reingold 1996; Tolleson-Rinehart 2001). In a study of
U.S. state legislators, Reingold (1996) found that men and women were equally skeptical
of stereotypically masculine behaviors involving coercion and manipulation, and legisla-
tors of both genders were likely to support stereotypically feminine leadership styles that
emphasize compromise and consensus-building to resolve conflicts.
A fourth difference includes men and women’s inclinations toward participation and
inclusion. Women’s leadership styles are argued to be more conducive to citizen involve-
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ment because women tend to adopt more democratic means of leading, while men tend
to lead in more autocratic or directive ways (Eagly and Johnson 1990; Eagly, Karau and
Johnson 1992). Research on U.S. state legislators found that women were more likely
to prioritize getting people involved, building coalitions, forging consensus, and sharing
power (Rosenthal 1997, 1998). In studies of business managers, Rosener (1990, 1995) ob-
served that men more often chose to use a top-down “command-and-control" leadership
style, while women were more likely to create spaces for participation in the organiza-
tion. These differences are also found among local government leaders. Studies of U.S.
mayors found that women have a more “hands-on" style of leadership (Tolleson-Rinehart
2001) and are more willing to modify the budget process to facilitate broader participation
(Weikart et al. 2007). Women city managers were also likely to express attitudes that favor
the incorporation of citizens and facilitate communication (Fox and Schuhmann 1999).
The majority of studies on leadership behavior have been conducted in U.S. settings.
However, there is some research from other countries as well, including Brazil. Over-
all, these studies echo previous findings, suggesting that men and women’s leadership
styles differ on several dimensions. In a study of Latin American business executives,
Consuelo Cárdenas et al. (2014) found that women believed that their leadership styles
differ from men executives, specifically because women are more sensitive and emotional.
Women managers in Nicaragua and Costa Rica also perceived gender differences and sug-
gested that women are more relationship-oriented and participative than men (Osland,
Snyder and Hunter 1998). Studies of Brazilian business managers suggest that women
are likely to value honesty and compassion, and present a leadership style that is more
related to people than to tasks (Grzybovski, Boscarin and Migott 2002). Other studies
of Brazilian leaders find that women’s styles are more flexible (Corsini and Souza Filho
2004) and democratic (Thon et al. 2012). However, some studies report no differences in
the leadership styles of Brazilian men and women (Santos and Antunes 2013; Gomes et al.
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2011).
4.2 Studying Gender and Behavior in Brazilian Municipalities
I study whether women’s leadership styles differ from their male counterparts using
data from over 5,500 municipalities in Brazil during the 2005-2008 term. Brazilian mu-
nicipalities provide a useful research design for several reasons. Because municipalities
are smaller units of government, local leaders may be better situated to open opportunities
for citizen participation in the policymaking process. Opening formal venues for popular
participation at higher levels of government may not be feasible in practice.2 However, at
the local level it may be easier for elected officials to institute participatory mechanisms
because political processes and outcomes can be better tailored to the preferences of a
smaller group of citizens.
Municipalities in Brazil are highly decentralized (Falleti 2010; Samuels 2004), so may-
ors have substantial autonomy and decision-making power. The 1988 Constitution pro-
vides mayors with significant authority that they can exercise with relatively few checks
on their power (Wampler 2007). Since mayors in Brazil are so powerful, this should be
one of the most likely cases in which the preferences of elected officials match their actual
behaviors. Additionally, since the constitution encourages citizen participation, mayors
who value the inclusion of citizens may be especially likely to adopt participatory institu-
tions. Thus, the mayoral office in Brazil should be the context in which women would be
most expected to facilitate channels of popular participation if their leadership styles are
really more inclusive than men.3
This subnational research design allows for certain variables – such as electoral laws
2Pogrebinschi and Samuels (2014) find evidence that contradicts this notion. The authors provide evi-
dence that participatory governance at the national level in Brazil can have a direct effect on national policy
outcomes.
3However, due to the legal mandates for participation in some policy areas, men mayors also face in-
centives to implement participatory institutions which may overshadow any significant gender differences in
these areas.
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and the timing of elections – to be held constant at the national level, while simultaneously
exploiting the variation in other variables – such as population, wealth, and gender of
the executive – at the subnational level. About 8% of mayors were women during the
2005-2008 term. Despite this low percentage, women mayors do not seem to differ much
from their male counterparts. Roughly the same percentages of men and women are from
parties on the left, center, and right of the ideological spectrum. On average, they govern
municipalities that are similar in size and urban status; however, women tend to govern
poorer municipalities. Women mayors tend to be slightly younger and more educated, but
the differences are small. Furthermore, a woman – Dilma Rousseff – was elected President
shortly after this time period (in 2010), suggesting that a large number of Brazilian voters
view women as capable political executives.
4.3 Participatory Institutions in Brazil
Since the end of authoritarianism in the 1980s, Brazil has experimented with different
methods of participatory governance (Avritzer 2009). The most researched is participatory
budgeting (PB). PB provides citizens with the opportunity to influence how a portion of the
municipal budget is to be spent (Cabannes 2004; Souza 2001; Wampler 2007; Wampler
and Avritzer 2004). In 2005-2008, 102 of Brazil’s 252 municipalities with more than
100,000 residents had PB.4 The design of PB varies greatly from one municipality to the
next. These systems vary in terms of their level of institutionalization and sustainability,
the size of funds being deliberated, the amount of influence that citizens have over the
budget, and the way that citizens are incorporated into the budgetary process. Overall,
research concludes that these institutions help to reduce clientelistic practices, improve the
distribution of scarce resources, enhance public deliberation and negotiation, and fortify
Brazil’s democratic government.
4Data for which municipalities have PB are available for municipalities greater than 100,000 residents. I
thank Brian Wampler, Leonardo Avritzer, and Paolo Spada for sharing their data with me.
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A less researched, yet just as common, form of participation in Brazil is local participa-
tory policy councils (conselhos municipais). These councils represent the most significant
constitutional effort to disperse political authority in Brazilian municipalities and were
designed to be public spaces for deliberation between state and civil society actors and
representative of different groups in the population (Avritzer 2009; Coelho 2006; Corn-
wall 2008; Houtzager and Lavalle 2010; Lavalle, Acharya and Houtzager 2005; Wampler
2007). This form of institutionalized participation was created as an effort to reduce cor-
ruption and clientelism and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public services
(Barth 2006).
The councils are legally required to follow the rule of parity, so that there is an equal
number of state and civil society representatives on the council. (For example, if a council
has 14 members, 7 should be government representatives and 7 should represent civil
society.) However, there are exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of health and
food security councils that may be composed of 25% government representatives, 25%
representatives of NGOs, and 50% consumers of public services. Council members are
nominated or elected by their institutions in the case of government representatives and
by civil society in the case of civil society representatives. The participatory councils are
established through municipal legislation, so the particular structure of each council varies.
The participation of the public in some policy areas, such as health, social assistance,
and education is mandated by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution (articles 198, 204, 205).
Municipalities are legally required to have five councils: Conselho Municipal de Saúde
(health), Conselho de Assistência Social (social assistance), Conselho de Controle Social
do Bolsa Família (social welfare program), Conselho do Fundef (elementary education
program), and Conselho de Alimentação Escolar (school meals). These mandatory coun-
cils are designed to inform municipal decisions about how to spend federally transferred
funds in these areas. As of 2008, approximately 97% of municipalities had a council for
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health, 95% had one for Fundef, and 98% had one for school meals.5 Initiating participa-
tory councils in other areas is voluntary, so there is a lot of variation in the number and
types of additional participatory councils that exist in each municipality (see Table 4.1).
In 2009, the Brazilian federal government included several questions on its annual
survey of municipalities (Pesquisa de Informações Básicas Municipais) to collect infor-
mation about the participatory policy councils that exist in each municipality and the year
in which each council was established. In total, the survey asked about the year of adoption
for 17 participatory councils. Table 4.1 lists the policy purview of each council as well as
how many municipalities adopted each council. These participatory policy councils, along
with participatory budgeting institutions, provide useful measures of the mayor’s efforts
to increase citizen participation in governmental affairs. Adopting one of these types of
institutions signals that the mayor is willing to govern in a more participatory way by con-
ceding some power to his/her constituents or by being willing to listen to the preferences
of citizens through a formalized channel of communication.
Mayors who do not comply with the legal requirements for participation run the chance
of being audited by the federal government (Tribunal de Contas) and potentially risk losing
state and/or federal transfers and facing impeachment. However, initiating participation in
other areas is voluntary and mayors may have incentives to increase participation in areas
that go beyond the constitutional mandate for several reasons. These incentives can be
broadly categorized into three groups: (1) personal incentives, (2) incentives from the
public, or (3) political incentives.
The mayor’s gender falls into the first category. Socialization experiences or compli-
ance with gendered norms and expectations may cause women to prefer more participatory
5Data from the 2009 Pesquisa de Informações Básicas Municipais. Survey did
not ask about social assistance or Bolsa Família councils. More information here:
http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/controlesocial/ConselhosMunicipaiseControleSocial.asp. I
thank Welles Abreu for sharing useful information about the mandatory councils with me.
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Table 4.1: Number of Municipalities That Have Adopted Each Policy Council
Number of Number of Total Number
Policy Council Adoptions in Adoptions Prior of Adoptions
2005-2008 to 2005 up to 2008
Healthcarea 471 4,756 5,227
Children & Adolescents’ Rights 856 4,046 4,902
Education 1,021 3,222 4,243
Environment 1,086 1,712 2,798
Housing/Habitation 1,480 561 2,041
Rights of the Elderly 886 968 1,854
Culture 539 739 1,278
Urban Policy & Development 606 276 882
Sports 156 423 579
Women’s Rights 272 275 547
Public Safety 200 319 519
Rights of Disabled Persons 278 186 464
Transportation 105 204 309
Rights of the Youth 158 114 272
Racial Equality 75 61 136
Human Rights 30 44 74
LGBT Rights 2 2 4
N municipalities: 5,558. Additional councils may exist. As of 2009: 5,466 municipalities had
a Tutelary Council; 5,260 had a FUNDEF (Fundo de Mantenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino
Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério) Councila; 4,284 had a School Council; 5,459 had
a School Meals Councila; 2,197 had a School Transportation Council; and 931 had a Community
of Safety Council. These councils not included in analyses because the year of adoption is not
reported. LGBT = lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. aParticipation is mandated.
ways of governing. Additionally, personal characteristics, including age and education, or
ideology (Donaghy 2011), might incentivize the mayor. The second category includes
public demands for participation. Avritzer (2009) discusses the fundamental role that civil
society organizations (CSOs) played in the development of the first council in São Paulo
in 1979. Two popular movements, one led by health professionals and the other by poor
people lacking healthcare, led to the creation of the first participatory council, which then
led to the mandates for participation included in the constitution (Avritzer 2009, 119).
CSOs are argued to play a role in the adoption of voluntary councils as well (Donaghy
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2011). The final category includes political or electoral incentives that the mayor may
face. As Wampler (2004, 82) suggests, politicians may use participatory institutions “as
a means to create new bases of political support." CSOs can help politicians campaign,
mobilize voters, and distribute informational materials, so officials may be inclined to im-
plement participatory institutions as a way to increase interactions with CSOs; suggesting
that motivation to increase participation can stem from electoral concerns as well.
4.4 Data and Variables
I use several dependent variables to measure whether the mayor’s leadership style is
pro-participation, including the adoption of participatory budgeting, the total number of
participatory councils adopted, and the adoption of participatory councils in 16 specific
areas. Since the same council cannot be adopted twice, each analysis is limited to the mu-
nicipalities that don’t currently have that particular council (i.e. municipalities that adopted
the council prior to 2005 are omitted)6 The analysis for participatory budgeting is limited
to municipalities with more than 100,000 residents due to data availability; however, the
analyses for participatory councils include all municipalities. The data cover one mayoral
term (2005-2008), and the adoption of a participatory institution at any point during this
term is counted as part of the mayor’s efforts to increase participation.7
Aside from the mayor’s gender, other characteristics might influence the mayor’s deci-
sion to increase citizen participation. For this reason, the analyses control for the mayor’s
age, education, party affiliation, and whether the mayor is eligible for reelection. The
mayor’s gender is coded 1 for a woman and 0 for a man. The mayor’s age is a continuous
6The analysis for participatory budgeting is not limited because the data show that some municipalities
have PB for one period, remove it, and then might reinstate it. For this reason, I consider all municipalities
that have PB during 2005-2008 to have “adopted" the institution, regardless of whether it existed in the
previous term.
7Elections were held in 2004 and the new cohort of mayors took office in January 2005. Data on the
mayor are from 2005 Pesquisa de Informações Básica Municipais. Municipal data are from 2010 national
census. Municipal legislature data are from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
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variable and education is a categorical variable that indicates the highest level of education
completed by the mayor. The mayor’s party affiliation is classified as left, center, right, or
unclassified based on Power and Zucco’s (2009, 2012) classifications of Brazilian parties
using surveys of national legislators.8 Mayors are ineligible for reelection if they have
already served two consecutive terms in office, so this variable is coded 1 for mayors who
are serving for a second term (i.e. ineligible for reelection), and 0 for mayors serving their
first term.
Characteristics of the municipality and municipal government might also influence the
mayor’s decision to open avenues for popular participation. Though power is mostly con-
centrated in the executive branch in Brazil (Power and Mochel 2008; Samuels 2003), the
municipal legislature does have some formal powers that could constrain the mayor’s be-
haviors (Wampler 2004).9 Additionally, having a larger municipal legislature might mean
that many voices are already represented and therefore participatory institutions seem less
necessary.10 For this reason, I control for the size of the municipal legislature, the percent-
age of the legislature that is from the same political party as the mayor, and the percent
women in the legislature.
To account for public demands for participation, I also control for the size of the munic-
ipal population, the percentage of the population residing in an urban area, and the average
monthly income of municipal residents. Since demands for participatory institutions are
likely to increase as the size and strength of civil society increases, I include a control for
the number of NGOs that exist in each municipality per 1,000 residents. Finally, in the
analyses for participatory councils, I control for the number of councils that were adopted
8Power and Zucco’s coding scheme is the most widely used classification of Brazilian parties. Other
classifications, such as Rodrigues (2002), largely correspond with Power & Zucco’s work. See Table C.2 in
Appendix C.
9There are substantial limitations to the extent to which municipal legislators can initiate legislation or
override decisions made by the mayor (Wampler 2007, 50-51).
10I thank the editors of Political Research Quarterly for highlighting this point.
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in the municipality prior to 2005. Mayors in municipalities with many participatory coun-
cils may be unlikely to adopt more councils. However, mayors in municipalities with
few councils may decide to adopt more participatory councils to increase participation in
different policy areas.
4.5 Empirical Analyses and Results
Table 4.2 presents the results of a logistic regression, where the dependent variable
equals one if the mayor adopted participatory budgeting while in office. The results sug-
gest that women mayors are not significantly more likely than men to adopt participatory
budgeting – at least in large municipalities (>100,000 residents). This finding is echoed in
the results presented in Table 4.3, where the dependent variable is a count of the total num-
ber of participatory councils adopted between 2005 and 2008. Results from this regression
(using all municipalities) suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in the
overall number of councils adopted by men and women. From this evidence, we might
conclude that women mayors in Brazil are not significantly more likely than their male
counterparts to increase opportunities for citizen participation. However, given that previ-
ous research has found that men and women often prioritize different policy areas (Barnes
2012; Jones 1997; Thomas 1994), men and women might also prioritize increasing partic-
ipation in certain policy areas over others.
Using a series of 16 logistic analyses, I examine whether women are more likely to
adopt participatory councils in certain policy domains. The dependent variable for each
model is coded 1 if the mayor adopted a participatory council for that policy area and
coded 0 if no council was adopted.11 Results suggest that there are statistically significant
differences in the likelihood that men and women mayors will adopt councils in four areas:
11Municipalities in which the council existed prior to 2005 were not included in the analyses. Results
from these regressions are reported in Appendix C along with summary statistics and the ideological classi-
fications of Brazilian political parties.
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Table 4.2: Are Municipalities with Women Mayors More Likely to Have Participatory
Budgeting?
Woman Mayor -0.024
(0.576)
Age of Mayor 0.012
(0.017)
Mayor’s Education 0.112
(0.125)
Ineligible for Reelection -0.803*
(0.333)
Mayor Party Left 1.724***
(0.370)
Mayor Party Right -0.128
(0.434)
Mayor Party Unclassified 1.793#
(0.997)
Size of Muni. Legislature 0.016
(0.059)
% Women Muni. Legis. -0.005
(0.014)
% Legis. of Mayor’s Party 0.056***
(0.015)
Population (logged) 0.432
(0.455)
% Urban Population 0.028
(0.024)
Avg. Income of Residents -0.001
(0.001)
NGOs per 1000 People -0.299
(0.300)
Constant -9.942#
(5.386)
Pseudo R-squared 0.180
Observations 252
Results from a logistic regression. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Dependent variable equals 1 if PB was adopted in 2005-
2008. Sample limited to municipalities > 100,000 residents.
#p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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Table 4.3: Do Women Adopt More Participatory Councils than Men?
Woman Mayor -0.061
(0.045)
Age of Mayor 0.003*
(0.001)
Mayor’s Education 0.023**
(0.008)
Ineligible for Reelection -0.171***
(0.028)
Mayor Party Left 0.169***
(0.033)
Mayor Party Right 0.021
(0.029)
Mayor Party Unclassified 0.014
(0.065)
Size of Muni. Legislature -0.008
(0.006)
% Women Muni. Legis. -0.000
(0.001)
% Legis. of Mayor’s Party 0.001
(0.001)
Population (logged) 0.260***
(0.013)
% Urban Population 0.004***
(0.001)
Avg. Income of Residents 0.001***
(0.000)
NGOs per 1000 People 0.026***
(0.006)
No. Councils Before 2005 -0.118***
(0.008)
Constant -2.703***
(0.138)
Alpha 0.122
Pseudo R-squared 0.047
Observations 5546
Results from a negative binomial regression analysis. Standard
errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a count of the
number of councils adopted in 2005-2008. #p<0.10, *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
80
women’s rights, children’s rights, healthcare, and sports. Figure 4.1 shows the predicted
probability that men and women will adopt certain councils holding control variables at
their mean values. These estimates suggest that men are nearly twice as likely as women
to adopt a council for women’s rights (p = 0.017 for women and p = 0.031 for men).
Men are also significantly more likely to adopt a council for children’s rights (p = 0.487
for women and p = 0.580 for men) and healthcare (p = 0.426 for women and p = 0.613
for men) compared to women mayors. Women, on the other hand, are significantly more
likely than men to adopt a participatory council for sports (p = 0.032 for women and p =
0.020 for men).
Figure 4.1: Probability that Mayors will Adopt Certain Councils
Control variables are held at their mean values. *Statistically significant difference at the 90% level.
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Regarding the control variables, mayors who are older and better educated are more
likely to adopt participatory institutions, while mayors who are ineligible to run for re-
election are significantly less likely to adopt participatory institutions in almost all areas.
Mayors from leftist parties are also more likely to increase participation, relative to mayors
from center parties. The size of the municipal legislature appears to decrease the proba-
bility of adopting participatory institutions, while a larger percentage of legislators from
the mayor’s party increases it for some models. The percent women in the legislature does
not appear to have a significant effect. The probability of adopting participatory institu-
tions also increases as the population, percent of population in an urban area, and average
income of citizens increases. The presence of NGOs also appears to increase the overall
number of councils that are adopted. Finally, the number of policy councils adopted prior
to 2005 appears to have a negative relationship with the total number of councils adopted
in 2005-2008. However, this variable has a positive effect on almost all of the individual
councils, suggesting that mayors are likely to adopt certain institutions if other types of
participatory institutions already exist in the municipality.
4.6 Discussion
The results of this study suggest that women leaders are not inherently more partici-
patory than men. Women are not more likely to adopt participatory budgeting and do not
adopt more participatory policy councils than men. Women are more likely than men to
adopt a council for sports; however, men are more likely than women to adopt councils for
women’s rights, children’s rights, and healthcare.
There are several possible explanations for these results. The first is that the mayoralty
in Brazil is a gendered institution and women mayors are adapting to the leadership styles
of men. Acker (1992, 567) defines an institution as gendered if “gender is present in the
processes, practices, distribution of power, and images and ideologies" of the institution.
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Less than 10% of mayors are women, so it is possible that newly elected women act
similar to their male counterparts because they assimilate to the institutional roles that have
typically been filled by men (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Lovenduski 1986; Reingold
1996). Furthermore, if the mayoralty is a gendered institution, then women may feel
obligated to emphasize leadership traits that are tied to masculinity in order to display the
characteristics expected of a leader. If women emphasize a different image of leadership,
they risk being seen as unfit for their leadership role, “as indecisive, soft, and not assertive
enough" (Stivers 2002, 72).
A second explanation for these results is the Brazilian political context. Given that
the Brazilian government encourages citizen participation in the policymaking process –
and even legally mandates it in some policy areas – both men and women elected officials
may be especially likely to value citizen participation and, thus, gender differences may be
minimized in this aspect. Future research may find greater gender differences in contexts
where participation is not as highly emphasized.
A third reason for these findings may be that there is a disjuncture between the prefer-
ences and behaviors of women elected officials. Studies that find that women’s leadership
styles are more participatory than men’s often rely on self-reported data about women’s
preferences toward participation. It could be that (a) women do prefer to be more partic-
ipatory, but their actions are constrained by the environments in which they work or (b)
women don’t actually prefer to be more participatory, but think that this trait is viewed
as a desirable characteristic of women leaders, so they offer responses that are socially
desirable, but do not act according to these expressed preferences.
One of the most plausible explanations for these findings is that both men and women
leaders are strategic in their decisions to increase citizen participation in particular policy
areas. It appears that mayors are being strategic in how they present themselves to their
constituents and in which areas they open up to participation. Women aren’t more inclu-
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sive across all policy areas. Rather, women are likely to increase participation in an area
that is not traditionally considered feminine – sports. Men also appear to be acting strate-
gically by opening up avenues for participation in areas that are not traditionally masculine
– women’s rights, children’s rights, and healthcare.12 These findings suggest that mayors
are likely to increase participation in areas that appeal to constituents of the opposite gen-
der and distance the mayor from stereotypes that are tied to his/her gender. Increasing
participation in a masculine (feminine) policy area may allow women (men) to present
themselves as well-rounded, as prioritizing not only feminine policy areas, but masculine
ones as well.
Further indication that the decision to increase participation is a strategic choice is pro-
vided by the finding that mayors who are ineligible to run for reelection are less likely to
adopt participatory institutions, while mayors from leftists parties, highly educated may-
ors, and mayors of large, urban, and wealthy municipalities with a large number of NGOs
are more likely to adopt these institutions. If the mayor cannot compete for reelection,
then there is little need for him/her to increase participation as a way of appealing to vot-
ers. But, if there are high demands for participation, it may be strategic for mayors to
create formal channels for citizen inclusion. It appears that factors other than the mayor’s
gender largely determine whether the mayor will adopt participatory institutions in most
policy areas.
To illustrate this interpretation of the results, consider the case of Osasco, São Paulo –
a city with an urban population of about 700,000. A man, Emídio Pereira de Souza, was
elected as mayor of Osasco in 2004. Mayor de Souza is from the PT, is college educated,
and served his first term as mayor in 2005-2008. During his first year in office, de Souza
12Since participatory health councils are legally mandated, the incentive to create a health council may
be motivated more by fear of sanctions than by gender, ideology, or electoral concerns. However, which
incentive weighs most heavily on the mayor’s decision cannot be teased out using these data and, thus,
gender cannot be ruled out as a potential cause of the adoption of health councils.
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authorized the creation of a participatory council for women’s rights (Ordinance No. 3980
of December 27, 2005). A speaker at the public forum announcing the creation of the
council attributed much credit to the mayor, stating: “Thanks to the support of the munici-
pal government and to the interests of the mayor in racial and gender equality, we continue
to advance. It was not easy, but we’ve obtained many achievements."13 The mayor himself
was quick to boast his achievements in the area of women’s equality, highlighting that he
had recently hired one hundred women to the municipal guard and that one of his first
measures as mayor was to create the Coordination Office of Gender and Race and the
Women’s Resource Center.
In the case of Osasco, it appears that the adoption of a women’s rights council was
a function of the mayor’s leftist ideology and concerns for the advancement of women’s
equality. Yet, in his boastful rhetoric regarding his record on advancing women’s equality,
it appears that de Souza was making attempts to appeal to women constituents to garner
political support. Mayor de Souza would go on to adopt several other participatory in-
stitutions during his first term in office and would successfully secure reelection in 2008
to serve another term as mayor of Osasco. The quantitative evidence presented above,
along with the anecdote offered here, suggests that the creation of participatory institu-
tions is driven by electoral concerns and that these institutions may be viewed as a tool for
building political support.
4.7 Conclusions
As the number of women leaders increases, it is important to know whether women
have different styles of leading and whether these styles will ultimately result in different
outcomes. Knowing whether men and women have different approaches to governing
13Author’s translation. Quote attributed to Joana D’Arc Lara, who was coordinator of the Coordenadoria
de Gênero e Raça da Prefeitura de Osasco at the time. News of the public forum was reported by Osasco
Notícias in the article Gênero e Raça apresenta proposta do Conselho da Mulher, published on August 10,
2005. Accessed by the author on April 30, 2015 at http://www.osasco.sp.gov.br/InternaNot.aspx?id=455.
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is important because these differences could ultimately impact policy outcomes, public
opinion, representation, and the functioning of democratic institutions. Do women lead
in a way that is more participatory? This question was explored within the context of
Brazilian municipalities by examining whether women mayors were more likely than men
to adopt different types of participatory institutions. The results of the study suggest that
the answer to this question is no – at least in the context considered here. Women’s styles
of leadership aren’t inherently more participatory than men’s. Rather, the decision to
increase participation in a certain area is likely a strategic choice made by the mayor.
Mayors behave strategically by attempting to appeal to constituents of the opposite
gender and acting in ways that defy gender stereotypes. For men, this means present-
ing themselves as participatory and concerned with traditionally feminine issues related
to women, children, and health. For women, this means drawing attention away from
stereotypes about women’s leadership behaviors and increasing participation in masculine
areas, like sports. However, the gender of the executive was not statistically significant for
most models, suggesting that the decision to increase participation is largely a function of
other factors, including ideology, public demands for participation, and political concerns.
The finding that mayors who are ineligible for reelection are significantly less likely to
adopt participatory institutions implies that these institutions may be viewed as potential
sources of political support and may be created as part of an election ploy. Future research
should explore the generalizability of these results. Women might adopt different styles
of leading after they reach a numerical critical mass and their gender isn’t considered so
exceptional.14
14I thank the editors of Political Research Quarterly for highlighting this point about generalizability.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S
REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Women’s representation in local governments, though often higher than women’s na-
tional level representation, remains below parity in most countries across the globe. The
local level is argued to be easier for women to access because of its proximity to home
and because it requires less investment (in terms of time and resources) than higher-level
offices. Further, women’s involvement in local affairs makes the local level of govern-
ment the logical place to launch many women’s political careers. However, the local level
doesn’t always prove to be more favorable towards women. What are the causes and con-
sequences of women’s representation in local governments? Does it matter that women
continue to be underrepresented, even at the local level?
This dissertation contributes to answering these questions through three empirical stud-
ies. In the first study presented in chapter 2, I find that one of the potential causes of
women’s (lack of) representation is decentralization. By increasing the power and de-
sirability of local political offices, decentralization contributes to keeping women under-
represented in local offices, at least in the case of Latin American local governments.
The second study presented in chapter 3 also adds to our understanding of the causes of
women’s representation in local governments. I find that political parties in Brazil are
more likely to nominate women candidates for mayor when they are in a weak or undesir-
able position. Nominating women under these precarious circumstances, otherwise known
as a “glass cliff," likely decreases women’s chances of achieving political success in the
future. In the final empirical study, presented in chapter 4, I analyze some of the potential
consequences of women’s local level representation using the case of Brazilian mayors. I
find that while women’s leadership styles don’t differ significantly from men’s, there are
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gendered differences in men and women’s decisions about where (in which policy areas)
to initiate citizen participation. This finding suggests that men and women leaders may
take different courses of action that lead to different outcomes. Thus, electing women to
local offices will have different consequences than electing men to local offices—though
not always the consequences that are expected.
5.1 Theoretical Implications
What are the implications of these findings for the larger literature on gender and pol-
itics? In order to understand the broader implications, it is important to first realize the
limitation of these studies. First, its unclear the extent to which the empirical cases—Latin
American and Brazilian local governments—are representative of the rest of the world. Do
these contexts differ significantly from other regions of the world? Do the same causes and
consequences of women’s local representation in these contexts apply to other contexts as
well? The extent to which the findings obtained from these cases generalize to other cases
is an empirical question. However, these findings should be most generalizable to cases
that are similar to the ones used in these studies (e.g., local governments that are struc-
tured similarly to Latin American local governments). The theoretical insights, however,
are more generalizable and can be applied across various contexts and countries.
Second, this dissertation is limited to some extent by the availability of data. Par-
ticularly, the second chapter includes a small number of observations and only presents
data on the country-level average percent women in local governments. A more thorough
analysis of the effects of decentralization on women’s local representation would include
local-level data that are nested within countries over time to better pinpoint both the local-
and national-level causes of women’s local representation. It would also engage with the
intermediate (i.e., state, provincial, departmental) level of government and the gaps in
women’s representation between the different levels of government. For the third chapter,
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the analyses are limited by the lack of data on political parties’ recruitment and selection
mechanisms for local elected offices. But, newly released data on the six largest political
parties in Brazil may provide some insight into these processes that are typically hidden
from the public eye (Género y Partidos Políticos en América Latina, GEPPAL, see Roza
2010; Roza, Llanos and de la Roza 2011). This chapter would also benefit from qualitative
interviews with women candidates and political party leaders. The fourth chapter, though
it is already published, is also limited in that it’s difficult to determine whether the partic-
ipatory councils that mayors create actually improve citizen participation or whether they
are largely symbolic acts.
Despite these limitations, this dissertation offers many contributions to research on
women and politics, and to social science research in general. First, it suggests that even
seemingly gender-neutral processes and policies, such as decentralization, can have gen-
dered consequences, and that women face invisible barriers in their pursuit of represen-
tation that are not easily quantified, like the glass cliff. These barriers at the local level
can have serious repercussions for women’s representation in state and national level in-
stitutions since local offices may provide women with an entryway into politics. Identify-
ing obscure obstacles such as these may be the first step to improving women’s political
representation. Second, it suggests that there are indeed consequences to women’s rep-
resentation in local governments. Women’s preferences and behaviors often differ from
their men counterparts, which results in different political outcomes that vary according
to whether men or women are in power. Most importantly, outcomes and substantive
representation for women tend to be better when women are present in decision-making
institutions. Thus, it’s problematic that women remain underrepresented in nearly every
political institution across the world.
This dissertation also highlights the importance of local governments for women’s
descriptive and substantive representation. Local governments may provide a pathway
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to women’s representation in higher offices, but this dissertation suggests they can also
directly affect the lives of women citizens. By allocating (or failing to deliver) social ser-
vices, formulating and implementing policy, and acting as a gatekeeper to political power,
local governments can shape the quality of women’s day-to-day life. Local governments
differ from national governments on many dimensions so it’s important that scholars of
gender and politics develop theories and hypotheses that are appropriate for the local con-
text and don’t apply national-level theories haphazardly. Finally, since conceptualizations
of gender, gender identity, and gender roles are fluid and vary across time and space, it is
important to study the effects of gender across multiple contexts over time. The causes
and consequences of women’s local representation is partly a function of views of gender
and gender-appropriate roles for women in society. Societies in which being a woman
is seen as incompatible with being a leader likely have few women in positions of power.
However, even the most gender-equal societies can express resistance to measures aimed at
improving women’s political representation (Maria Holli, Luhtakallio and Raevaara 2006).
The differences and similarities between these two contexts can matter for the results of
studies on gender and politics. As conceptualizations of gender roles and gender identity
continue to evolve, research on the relationship between gender and politics must evolve
as well.
5.2 Policy Implications
For those interested in improving levels of women’s representation in local govern-
ments, it may be useful to discuss the policy implications that arise from this dissertation.
Results from the study presented in chapter 2 suggests that decentralization can lead to
lower levels of women’s representation in local legislatures. Decentralization increases
the power and desirability of local offices which disadvantages women because women
are more likely to lack access to the networks and resources needed to win powerful polit-
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ical offices. Rather than suggesting that decentralization should be abandoned altogether,
these results imply that decentralized countries should take measures to counteract the po-
tential negative effects of decentralization on women’s local representation, such as adopt-
ing local-level gender quotas and supporting women candidates for local offices. The
policy implications that arise from the study of women mayoral candidates presented in
chapter 3 are that political parties and women’s organizations should take steps to ensure
that women are nominated not only under adverse circumstances but have a chance at
getting nominated for favorable positions as well. Results presented in chapter 4 suggest
that women leaders make different choices than men leaders and thus their representation
matters for the types of policies that are implemented.
Each of the studies included in this dissertation point to the need for measures that
can improve women’s descriptive representation. And by improving women’s descriptive
representation, these measures can likely lead to improvements in women’s substantive
representation as well. Different actors, including local, state, and national governments,
political parties, women’s groups, international agencies, non-governmental organizations,
and women themselves, can contribute to creating programs and policies that help women
get elected to local offices. One of the biggest barriers to women’s local representation
is simply encouraging women to run for office and incentivizing political parties to nom-
inate women. The adoption of gender quotas with placement mandates and enforcement
mechanisms have proven useful in getting women elected to political institutions at the
national level of government and these types of affirmative action initiatives should work
for the local level as well. In addition to quotas, political parties can take measures to in-
crease the likelihood that women will be nominated. Using candidate selection procedures
that are centralized and exclusive—enabling national-level party elites to select local-level
candidates—allows women to avoid informal norms and institutions that obstruct their
pathway to candidacy (Hinojosa 2009, 2012).
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Step two is ensuring that once women are nominated, they are able to compete on
a level playing field with their male opponents. Providing women with candidate train-
ing, campaign resources, and opportunities for voter outreach can increase the likelihood
that women will win elections. Developing women’s support organizations and inclusive
political networks that can override the old boys’ networks that have traditionally domi-
nated political power may also improve women’s electoral chances. Finally, once women
succeed in winning elections, these organizations should continue to provide support to
facilitate women’s future political success. Political institutions that offer environments in
which women have the leeway to make decisions and the discretion to take actions as they
see fit will ultimately result in better outcomes for society and likely lead to improvements
in women’s substantive representation. There is evidence that women participate at equal
rates with men if they are elected to institutions that are relatively gender balanced (Funk
and Taylor-Robinson 2014; Funk, Morales and Taylor-Robinson Forthcoming). Thus, as
women’s representation in political institutions continues to rise, women should be better
able to legislate and execute laws.
5.3 Moving Forward: Directions for Future Research
For all that this dissertation has to contribute, there are still many questions that remain
unanswered and much research left to do. One of the most obvious steps for research
on gender and local governments moving forward is to empirically test whether women
actually fare better in local governments than in national ones. That is, whether women’s
representation at the local level is always higher than at the national level. If not, under
what conditions does women’s national level representation exceed women’s local level
representation? If so, which factors contribute to decreasing the gap between women’s
local and national representation? Are local governments easier for women to access?
Does women’s representation at the local level provide a springboard to higher office? Or,
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particularly in the presence of gender quotas, do women sidestep lower level offices and
go directly into national level ones? Answering these questions can provide insight into
whether women’s pathways to power start from the bottom-up or top-down, or whether
women take a more circuitous route to power.
A second avenue for research is determining whether the same causes of women’s
representation at the national level also apply to the local level. Though research in this
area is more abundant (for a review of Latin America, see Escobar-Lemmon and Funk
N.d.), it is unclear the extent to which national-level processes are replicated at the local
level. Women at all levels of government may face obstacles in accessing powerful and
desirable political offices, but the unique context of local governments makes the role
of decentralization even more relevant for women’s local level representation. Moving
forward, research on the gendered consequences of decentralization should analyze how
both local-level and country-level factors influence women’s local representation. It is
also important to study women’s descriptive representation in different local venues—
executives, legislatures, bureaucracies, judiciaries, political parties, and non-governmental
organizations—because these venues can shape local outcomes in various ways.
On the consequences side of the equation, more research is needed into how women’s
local representation matters. What difference does it make if women are represented in
local institutions? Does women’s representation have a significant effect on political out-
comes and institutions? Do women leaders’ attitudes and behaviors differ from their men
counterparts and how does the local institutional context shape these differences? Are out-
comes better for women citizens when women are represented in local offices? Do women
local leaders change societal views or change institutional processes in favor of women’s
interests? How do women in local offices confront stereotypes and the double bind of
acting both as a woman and as a leader? These are just a few of the many questions that
remain open for future research on gender in local governments.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
This appendix provides supplementary information for chapter 2 “Localized Women:
The Gendered Consequences of Decentralization Reforms." Table A.1 provides summary
statistics for the variables included in the analyses. Table A.2 lists the sources of data and
Table A.3 lists the countries and years included in the analyses.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Women Councilors 22.096 8.768 4.2 42.318 54
Women Mayors 7.138 4.144 0 24.7 54
Local Lawmaking Authority 0.648 0.482 0 1 54
Local New Tax 0.278 0.452 0 1 54
Local Social Services 2.87 2.411 0 6 54
# Muni Per Million 29.411 16.143 5.655 79.8 54
Yrs Local Elections 25.556 14.731 8 75 54
Mayor Indirectly Elected 0.148 0.359 0 1 54
Local Quota 0.537 0.503 0 1 54
Female Labor Participation 49.917 7.402 34.7 67.8 54
% Urban Pop 70.535 12.874 45.127 94.414 54
Population 39.543 54.648 3.17 201.03 54
GDP Per Capita 5026.348 3367.473 1007.003 15253.331 54
% Women Nat Legislature 16.686 8.015 2.5 38.6 54
Prev % Women Council 19.556 8.928 4.2 46.3 54
Prev % Women Mayors 6.076 3.547 0 13.5 54
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Table A.2: Sources of Data
Variable Source
Women Councilors ECLAC Gender Observatory
Women Mayors ECLAC Gender Observatory
Local Lawmaking Authority Comparative Constitutions Project
Local New Tax Martínez-Vázquez (2010, 212)
Local Social Services Author based on Rosales and Valencia (2008, 187)
# Muni per Million Author based on Rosales and Valencia (2008, 176)
Yrs Local Elections Author based on Rosales and Valencia (2008, 176)
Mayor Indirectly Elected World Bank Political Decentralization Indicators, 2012
Local Quota Coded by author based on Quota Project
Female Labor Participation World Bank Development Indicators
% Urban Pop World Bank Development Indicators
Population No Ceilings: The Full Participation Project
GDP per Capita World Bank Development Indicators
% Women Nat Legislature ECLAC Gender Observatory
Prev % Women Council Author based on ECLAC Gender Observatory
Prev % Women Mayors Author based on ECLAC Gender Observatory
Local Social Services = schools, health care, housing, social services, culture, sports and leisure
Table A.3: Countries and Years Included in Analyses
Country Years Included
Bolivia 2000, 2005, 2010
Brazil 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
Chile 2001, 2005, 2009, 2012
Colombia 2001, 2004, 2008, 2012
Costa Rica 2006, 2011
Dominican Rep. 2002, 2006, 2010
Ecuador 2000, 2005, 2010
El Salvador 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012
Guatemala 2000, 2004, 2008
Honduras 2002, 2006, 2010
Mexico 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Nicaragua 2008
Panama 2004, 2009
Paraguay 2001, 2006, 2010
Peru 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011
Uruguay 2000, 2005, 2010
Venezuela 2002
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
This appendix provides supplementary information for chapter 3 “Running on a Ledge:
Women Mayoral Candidates and the Glass Cliff in Brazil." Table B.1 provides summary
statistics for the variables included in the quantitative analyses.
Table B.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Woman Candidate 0.112 0.315 0 1 41047
Against Incumbent Party 0.367 0.482 0 1 41047
Against Incumbent Mayor 0.161 0.368 0 1 41047
Lagged Vote Share 17.205 22.59 0 99.557 41047
Current Vote Share 34.132 19.249 0 100 41047
Budget per Capita 2,039.563 1,246.541 123.022 29,813.16 41047
Size of Budget (mil.) 101.953 903.91 1.565 37,285.289 41047
1-year  in Budget (mil.) 14.444 126.405 -1349.765 5198.927 40748
4-year  in Budget (mil.) 40.342 351.65 -135.041 13,408.44 41047
Left Party 0.338 0.473 0 1 41047
Right Party 0.325 0.468 0 1 41047
Center Party 0.279 0.448 0 1 41047
Unclassified Party 0.059 0.236 0 1 41047
Municipal Population 44,373 294,673 834 8,619,170 41047
Population (logged) 9.356 1.238 6.726 15.969 41047
% Female in Electorate 49.64 2.132 39.034 56.931 41047
Avg. Edu. of Electorate 3.355 0.541 1.854 5.772 41047
Avg. Age of Electorate 3.829 0.212 3.116 4.706 41047
Possibility of Run-off 0.033 0.178 0 1 41047
Prev. Mayor Woman 0.073 0.26 0 1 41047
No. Candidates 3.114 1.362 1 14 41047
No. Women Candidates 0.356 0.582 0 4 41047
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
This appendix provides supplementary information for chapter 4 “Gendered Govern-
ing? Women’s Leadership Styles and Participatory Institutions in Brazil." Table C.1 pro-
vides summary statistics. Table C.2 lists the ideological classifications of Brazilian politi-
cal parties. Table C.3, table C.4, and table C.5 present the results from logistic regression
models that inform the study.
Table C.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Woman Mayor 0.081 0.273 0 1 IBGE
Age 48.558 9.638 22 88 IBGE
Mayor’s Education 4.578 1.748 1 7 IBGE
Ineligible Reelection 0.285 0.452 0 1 IBGE
Left Party 0.228 0.42 0 1 Power & Zucco
Center Party 0.348 0.476 0 1 Power & Zucco
Right Party 0.382 0.486 0 1 Power & Zucco
Party Unclassified 0.041 0.199 0 1 Power & Zucco
Size of Muni. Leg. 7.115 1.722 2 46 Author/TSE
% Women Muni. Leg. 12.389 12.82 0 85.714 Author/TSE
% Leg. Mayor’s Party 25.145 16.636 0 100 Author/TSE
Population 33878 200586 805 11253503 IBGE
% Urban Population 63.859 22.03 5.522 100 IBGE
Avg. Income 557.189 121.505 200 1500 IBGE
NGOs per 1000 2.492 2.354 0 29.925 IBGE
Councils prior 2005 3.225 1.866 0 15 Author/IBGE
Total No. of Councils 1.481 1.452 0 10 Author/IBGE
N = 5546. Some observations are not included due to missing values on one or more variables.
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Table C.3: AreWomenMore Likely to Adopt Participatory Councils? (RegressionModels
1 - 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women’s Human Children’s Youth’s Elderly Disability
Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights Rights
Woman Mayor -0.616* -0.396 -0.379# -0.116 -0.121 -0.125
(0.294) (0.755) (0.195) (0.317) (0.142) (0.264)
Age of Mayor 0.002 0.019 0.003 -0.006 0.009* 0.016*
(0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
Mayor’s Education 0.094* 0.056 0.030 0.134* 0.063** 0.124**
(0.044) (0.123) (0.032) (0.060) (0.024) (0.047)
Ineligible Reelection -0.227 -0.178 -0.285* 0.052 -0.158# -0.173
(0.154) (0.425) (0.122) (0.186) (0.088) (0.153)
Left Party 0.608*** 0.193 0.278# 0.482* 0.105 0.106
(0.178) (0.454) (0.157) (0.214) (0.104) (0.177)
Right Party 0.485** -0.599 0.335** 0.172 -0.182* -0.014
(0.168) (0.513) (0.127) (0.214) (0.091) (0.166)
Party Unclassified -0.187 0.363 0.092 -0.614 -0.206 0.132
(0.402) (0.810) (0.247) (0.613) (0.199) (0.361)
Size of Muni. Leg. -0.106*** 0.016 -0.007 -0.030 0.034 -0.083**
(0.030) (0.051) (0.045) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
% Women Muni. Leg. 0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
% Legis. Mayor’s Pty 0.001 0.007 -0.004 -0.010# 0.000 0.006
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Population (logged) 0.768*** 0.698** -0.128* 0.385*** 0.354*** 0.871***
(0.078) (0.214) (0.061) (0.094) (0.043) (0.082)
% Urban Population 0.010* 0.018 0.005 0.012* 0.004* 0.008#
(0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Avg. Income -0.002** -0.003# 0.002** -0.001 -0.000 0.001*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NGOs per 1000 0.004 0.128 -0.007 0.073# 0.005 0.010
(0.046) (0.095) (0.026) (0.043) (0.020) (0.047)
Councils Prior 2005 0.231*** -0.032 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.096*** 0.152***
(0.042) (0.104) (0.046) (0.047) (0.028) (0.040)
Constant -11.027*** -13.052*** -0.307 -8.477*** -6.019*** -14.409***
(0.793) (2.150) (0.771) (0.927) (0.518) (0.840)
Pseudo R-squared 0.167 0.105 0.037 0.121 0.044 0.236
Observations 5271 5502 1507 5432 4579 5360
Results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if the council was adopted between 2005
and 2008 and 0 if the council was not adopted. Municipalities in which the council existed prior to 2005
were not included in the analyses. #p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table C.4: AreWomenMore Likely to Adopt Participatory Councils? (RegressionModels
7 - 11)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Racial Equality Education Environment Culture Healthy
Woman Mayor -0.985 -0.113 -0.000 -0.232 -0.758**
(0.621) (0.153) (0.135) (0.182) (0.290)
Age of Mayor -0.019 0.001 0.002 0.011* 0.003
(0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Mayor’s Education 0.203* -0.004 0.046* 0.076* -0.022
(0.102) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.046)
Left Party 0.314 0.163 0.269** 0.428*** 0.091
(0.296) (0.119) (0.102) (0.122) (0.226)
Ineligible Reelection -0.731* -0.092 -0.182* -0.395*** -0.587***
(0.311) (0.099) (0.087) (0.113) (0.173)
Right Party -0.227 0.264** -0.006 -0.059 -0.167
(0.347) (0.102) (0.090) (0.116) (0.183)
Party Unclassified 0.241 0.497* 0.339# -0.243 -0.517
(0.657) (0.220) (0.192) (0.288) (0.380)
Size of Muni. Leg. -0.096* 0.010 -0.014 -0.004 -0.012
(0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.023) (0.054)
% Women Muni. Leg. -0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
% Legis. Mayor’s Pty -0.007 0.007* 0.005# 0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Population (logged) 0.949*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.180*** -0.250**
(0.168) (0.051) (0.042) (0.050) (0.083)
% Urban Population 0.017 0.005# 0.002 0.012*** 0.002
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Avg. Income -0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002#
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
NGOs per 1000 0.038 0.026 0.019 -0.050# 0.013
(0.110) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.043)
Councils Prior 2005 0.140* -0.015 0.263*** 0.137*** 0.333***
(0.062) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.062)
Constant -14.840*** -4.210*** -5.518*** -6.045*** 1.483
(1.637) (0.673) (0.557) (0.535) (1.018)
Pseudo R-squared 0.274 0.024 0.066 0.077 0.080
Observations 5485 2294 3835 4807 798
Results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if the council was adopted between 2005
and 2008 and 0 if the council was not adopted. Municipalities in which the council existed prior to 2005
were not included in the analyses. #p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. yThe health council is
constitutionally mandated.
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Table C.5: AreWomenMore Likely to Adopt Participatory Councils? (RegressionModels
12 - 16)
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Sports Urban Policy Housing Transportation Public Safety
Woman Mayor 0.484# 0.194 0.072 -0.069 0.228
(0.273) (0.169) (0.119) (0.391) (0.249)
Age of Mayor 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.011 -0.008
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008)
Mayor’s Education 0.068 -0.003 0.018 0.039 0.042
(0.056) (0.030) (0.020) (0.069) (0.049)
Ineligible Reelection -0.716*** -0.282* -0.256*** -0.657** -0.319#
(0.217) (0.112) (0.075) (0.255) (0.179)
Left Party 0.137 0.154 0.233** 0.089 0.302
(0.212) (0.126) (0.089) (0.262) (0.190)
Right Party -0.267 -0.047 -0.021 0.024 -0.038
(0.207) (0.116) (0.077) (0.250) (0.185)
Party Unclassified -0.033 -0.085 -0.211 -0.645 0.312
(0.485) (0.260) (0.178) (0.753) (0.362)
Size of Muni. Leg. -0.009 -0.083** -0.036 -0.067# -0.018
(0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.037) (0.029)
% Women Muni. Leg. -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.016# -0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006)
% Legis. Mayor’s Pty 0.008 0.000 0.004# 0.008 -0.007
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Population (logged) 0.282** 0.836*** 0.282*** 0.904*** 0.270***
(0.093) (0.056) (0.036) (0.123) (0.079)
% Urban Population 0.003 0.004 0.005** 0.016* 0.012*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
Avg. Income 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
NGOs per 1000 0.070# 0.097*** 0.133*** 0.176*** 0.009
(0.036) (0.023) (0.016) (0.043) (0.042)
Councils Prior 2005 0.175*** 0.078** 0.218*** 0.046 0.102*
(0.052) (0.030) (0.023) (0.060) (0.044)
Constant -9.239*** -12.010*** -4.834*** -14.681*** -7.185***
(0.916) (0.597) (0.407) (1.240) (0.807)
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.193 0.075 0.174 0.075
Observations 5123 5270 4985 5342 5204
Results from logistic regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if the council was adopted between 2005
and 2008 and 0 if the council was not adopted. Municipalities in which the council existed prior to 2005
were not included in the analyses. #p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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